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Abstract
Attempts to curb undesired behavior through regulation gets complicated when agents
can adapt to circumvent enforcement. We test a model of enforcement with learning and
adaptation, by auditing vendors selling illegal fish in Chile in a randomized controlled trial,
and tracking them daily using mystery shoppers. Conducting audits on a predictable
schedule and (counter-intuitively) at high frequency is less effective, as agents learn to
take advantage of loopholes. A consumer information campaign proves to be almost as
cost-effective and curbing illegal sales, and obviates the need for complex monitoring and
policing. The Chilean government subsequently chooses to scale up this campaign.
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Introduction

Correcting market failures and improving economic efficiency often require curbing undesirable
behaviors of market agents who act to maximize their private benefits. Examples span actions
that affect the natural environment, such as deforestation, pollution, or resource exploitation
(Stavins, 2011; Duflo et al., 2013, 2018; Hansman et al., 2018); Actions that affect community health such as open defecation or drunk driving (Banerjee et al., 2017); Or actions that
undermine government performance such as corruption or tax evasion (Carrillo et al., 2017).
Enforcing regulations is the most direct strategy to deter such behaviors. Enforcement not
only requires strong state capacity, but also sophisticated policing to track agents’ reactions to
audits, so that policies are robust enough to deter cheating even when agents try to ‘game’ the
new system.
Targeted agents adapt to new rules, finding loopholes that allow them to continue maximizing private benefits at the expense of others.1 In many instances, it is therefore insufficient to
evaluate the effectiveness of enforcement activities based on their immediate, short-run effects
(Fudenberg and Levine, 2020). A more sophisticated evaluation will need to track the (sometimes unanticipated) strategies that targeted agents may deploy to circumvent the regulation
as they adjust to the new regime.
We develop a model of enforcement paired with an experimental design and data collection
strategy that delineate how agents learn about the patterns of, and loopholes in, enforcement.
We highlight adaptation along two different margins: (i) the agent learning audit patterns and
schedules over time, and (ii) the agent devising defensive strategies to avoid paying fines even
when he is audited. Our Bayesian model of learning also yields predictions on the specific
design of enforcement strategies that will be more robust to the agent’s subversive adaptation
efforts. We test these predictions by conducting a large-scale randomized controlled trial (RCT)
1

For example, Carrillo, Pomeranz, and Singhal (2017) show that when the Ecuadorian tax authority improves the quality of their information on firm revenues, the firms react by raising their estimates of costs in
line with the revised revenue estimates, to keep total tax payments unchanged. Blattman et al. (2017) shows
that intensive policing pushes crime around the corner, with null impacts on overall violent crimes. Health
officials adapt to undermine a monitoring scheme to punish delinquent nurses in Banerjee et al. (2008), making
an initially-effective program completely ineffective in 18 months.
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in which government monitors penalize vendors that sell illegal fish in Chile, while we surreptitiously monitor vendors’ reactions to that enforcement by deploying “mystery shoppers” in fish
markets. We cross-randomized the frequency of enforcement visits and the (un)predictability
of schedules to test theoretical predictions about the optimal design of audit policy. Not surprisingly, we see that fish vendors find it more difficult to adapt when monitoring visits are
unpredictable. The theory and experiments also deliver a counter-intuitive result: Auditing is
more effective when it is conducted at lower frequency. Even if enforcement is very cheap to
conduct, the auditor will sometimes do better by holding back some effort.
This experiment takes place at scale in a consequential setting, targeting a problem that
has large welfare consequences. The government of Chile has instituted a ban on fishing and
sales of critically endangered Pacific hake fish (merluza) during September each year, when
the fish reproduces. Catching hake during that period is especially ecologically destructive.
We randomize the fish markets where the government sends monitors to levy penalties on
vendors illegally selling fish. We also cross-randomize a consumer information campaign designed to educate consumers about the environmental risk associated with over-fishing of hake
and discourage consumption during the September ban period. This serves as a useful benchmark because less direct strategies such as information campaigns designed to change social
norms around the undesirable behavior2 , or marketing that appeals to people’s sense of fairness
(Hainmueller et al., 2015), or encouraging third-party reporting (Naritomi, 2018), may be more
cost-effective in settings where it is difficult to enforce rules. Our information campaign could
even complement the audit strategy: If vendors react to the enforcement by hiding their illegal
hake sales, then informed consumers may be an important second line of defense. Our 2x2
experimental design can test for such complementarities.
Since we are tracking illegal activities, we measure outcomes using “mystery shoppers” to
improve credibility of the data. We sent trained surveyors who look like typical shoppers to
2

For example, Chetty et al. (2014) partners with the Bangladesh tax authorities in an attempt to change
social norms to encourage firms to pay taxes (as opposed to enforcing tax laws directly), and Guiteras et al.
(2015) attempt to change social norms around toilet use (as opposed to directly banning the dangerous practice
of open defecation).
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each market to pose as buyers and (try to) purchase fish during the ban. We link the daily
reports from mystery shoppers to the enforcement logbook recorded by government inspectors
to test our model’s specific predictions on the nature of learning and adaptation in response to
variable patterns of enforcement visits that different vendors experience.
We also conducted consumer surveys to gather data on changes in demand for hake and
other substitutes, and consumer knowledge about the hake ban. We mapped all spatial and
market relationships between vendors and fishermen to study spill-overs across markets.3 Finally, we surveyed the fishermen who supply to these markets to explore whether interventions
implemented “downstream” (at the point of sale from vendors to consumers) traveled “upstream” the supply chain of fish. It is ultimately the fishermen who make the ecologically
sensitive decisions in the seas. Our sample covers all major markets where the majority of hake
is caught, which allows us to report on equilibrium outcomes, such as changes in fishermen
activities, or availability and price of hake substitutes. This produces a more comprehensive
evaluation of the full range of effects up and down the supply chain.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we conduct a program evaluation of the government’s audit and information campaigns. These interventions lower, but do not eliminate,
illegal hake sales. Second, we specify a model of learning and test its predictions, to develop a
more precise understanding of how regulated agents learn about the audit system, adapt, and
develop defensive strategies. Our mystery shoppers systematically record the new practices
vendors introduce to circumvent enforcement. Many do not display the hake openly during the
ban, but are willing to sell our mystery shoppers illegal fish that is hidden from plain view.
They also start keeping the hake on ice, and claim that the fish on display was caught in August
when it was still legal to do so. These reactions attenuate the effects of enforcement on the
true availability of illegal hake in markets.
Third, we introduce experimental variations in the design of the audit system to test which
strategies are more robust to such subversive adaptation. Audits on a predictable schedule
become less and less effective over time, as vendors learn monitoring schedules and shift sales
3

We use the gendered term “fishermen” because every single fisher we interviewed in Chile was a man.
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away from targeted days and markets. We also tried increasing monitoring frequency to better
contain temporal and spatial spillovers to other days of the week or other nearby markets, but
this strategy backfires. Increased frequency evidently allowed fish vendors to learn about the
flaws in the system more quickly and react with greater hiding and freezing of illegal fish.
Our findings shed light on a larger theoretical literature in Law and Economics on adaptation and subversive reactions to regulations (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003; Becker, 1968; Eeckhout
et al., 2010; Lazear, 2006). Also related is the literature on gaming incentive schemes where
agents adapt to undermine the intent of the regulator (Ederer et al., 2018; Oyer, 1998; Gravelle et al., 2010). That literature suggests that introducing unpredictability and opacity to
incentives can mitigate gaming by the agent and improve payoffs for the regulator. Both our
model and Okat (2016) predicts that random and less frequent enforcement hinders or delays
agents’ learning about the weaknesses of the auditing process. Our results call into question any
enforcement mechanism that economic theory deems “most efficient” without grappling with
the (potentially unanticipated) behavioral responses by regulated agents. We grapple with the
real-world complexities of implementing a large government enforcement program at scale, and
contribute to the empirical literature on the effects of monitoring and penalties (Boning et al.,
2018; Shimshack and Ward, 2005; Gray and Shimshack, 2011; Hansen, 2015; Pomeranz, 2015;
Johnson et al., 2019). The most closely related paper to ours is Banerjee et al. (2017)’s policing
intervention to curb drunk driving in India, where they randomized fixed vs rotational checkpoints (akin to our unpredictable monitoring) as well as the frequency of monitoring. They
estimate a model of driver learning, and infer evidence of strategic responses.
Beyond regulation and enforcement, we show that an easier-to-implement consumer information campaign is almost as effective in curbing the illegal activity as direct monitoring.4
We generate evidence on the real world challenges to implementing an auditing scheme in
one specific sector, but the sector and policy we study are globally relevant and important.5
4

Like our consumer information campaign, many other papers have evaluated indirect strategies in pursuit
of social goals, in environments where enforcement is expensive or difficult (Johnson, 2016; Jin and Leslie, 2003;
Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Alm et al., 2009; Shimeles et al., 2017; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002).
5
FAO (2007) emphasizes that “90 percent of the 38 million people recorded globally as fishers are classified
as small-scale, and an additional more than 100 million people are estimated to be involved in the small-scale
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FAO (2014) estimates that 31.4% of the world’s fish stocks were over-exploited to biologically
unsustainable levels in 2013, up from 10% in 1974. Costello et al. (2012) reports that overexploitation is worse in small-scale fisheries like the one we study, and such fisheries represent
the majority of the global catch. Illegal fishing accounts for US$10-23 billion worth of fish each
year. Fishing bans of the type we study in Chile are in effect in many countries around the
world, including China, Fiji, India, Ghana, Bangladesh, Peru and Myanmar. Some of these
other policies are extremely similar in structure to the Chile hake ban, such as a 22-day ban
on selling Hilsa fish in Bangladesh during the fish’s reproduction period, and a 60-day ban on
silverfish in Peru.6
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the context and experimental design in
section 2. Section 3 develops the theory of learning. Section 4 describes data collection.
Section 5 presents the empirical strategy and results, section 6 documents spillovers and market
equilibrium effects, and section 8 concludes the paper.

2

Background and Experimental Design

2.1

Context

With around 4,000 miles of coastline, Chile is one of the top ten fish producers in the world
(FAO, 2014). However, as in many other low and middle-income countries, the marine ecosystems have been threatened by over-fishing. The Chilean government has passed various regulations to protect threatened species over the last 20 years, including restrictive fishing quotas
and fishing ban periods. However, the fish population has continued to decrease, with 72% of
species rated as overexploited or collapsed by 2015 (Subpesca, 2015).
The majority of people carrying out fishing activities are small-scale and artisanal fishermen.
Small-scale fishermen contribute almost 40% of the national fishing volume, and up to 75% of
the hake fish market. Artisanal fishermen are organized in fishing villages called Caletas.
post-harvest sector.”
6
See
http://www.newagebd.net/article/52220/22-day-ban-on-hilsa-fishing-from-oct-7
https://elcomercio.pe/economia/peru/produce-establece-veda-nacional-pejerrey-60-dias-noticia-543012
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and

Around 76% of the caletas are located in rural areas along the extended Pacific coast, and they
are highly spatially dispersed (Subpesca, 2013). Their geographic dispersion, informality, and
the small-scale of operations of each individual fisherman make it difficult for the government
to monitor their activities. The absence of alternative income-generating activities for these
fishermen has also make it difficult to change the norms regarding “appropriate behavior” in this
industry. Furthermore, poor small-scale fishermen do not readily accept government-imposed
restrictions, and they have organized and unionized to create political opposition to government
policies that restrict fishing.
The Pacific Hake is the fish low and middle-income Chileans consume most, and also one of
the most important sources of protein for this population. The domestic hake market is served
entirely by the domestic supply. Imports and exports of hake are quite uncommon. In an
effort to protect the hake population, the Chilean National Marine Authority (Sernapesca) and
the central government have enacted various policies including restrictive fishing quotas and a
one-month ban on fishing and selling hake during the fish’s September reproduction cycle. Due
to difficulties in enforcing the ban, the hake population is now critically threatened, and has
shrunk to 18% of its long-term sustainable level (Subpesca, 2015).

2.2
2.2.1

Supply Chain of Illegal Fish
Caletas: Coastal Villages where Artisanal Fishermen Bring in their Catch

Most of the illegal hake fish is captured by small-scale rural fishermen operating out of hundreds
of caletas dotting the coastline. Each caleta contains between 10 and 100 fishing boats. Boats
are about 20 and 30 feet in length, and operated by two to three fishermen (see Figure A.1).
The fishermen operating out of each caleta are organized as a union to internally distribute the
fishing rights allocated to that caleta. In practice, each fisherman captures illegal, undeclared
fish beyond the allocated quota. WWF (2017) estimates that the amount of hake fished by
small-scale artisanal fishermen are between 3.8 and 4.5 times the legal quota. As a result, the
artisanal sector is responsible for 75% of the hake fish supplied in the market, even though they
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hold only 40% of the “official” hake quotas.
Fishermen go fishing using artisanal boats and nets at night and sell fish after sunrise. They
are able to target specific fish types by varying the location and depth at which the nets are
dropped. The fish is sold directly at the docks to three types of buyers: (1) fish vendors who
buy the fish to sell them in local markets, (2) intermediaries who supply fish to vendors located
in places further from the coast, and (3) households who live close to the caleta and buy the
fish for their own consumption. There is very little use of ice and refrigeration at this point in
the supply chain. The fish that vendors sell in local markets is typically fresh, and captured
the night before. Table C.3 in the Appendix describes caleta characteristics.

2.2.2

Ferias: Outdoor Markets where Hake is Sold

The majority of hake-fish sales to final consumers occur in ferias, which are outdoor urban
markets organized by municipalities. Each vendor pays a fee every six months to rent a selling
spot in the market. In addition to fish, ferias sometimes contain stalls offering fruit and
vegetables, clothes and other products.
Ferias are typically navigable only by foot, and each feria serves a limited geographic area of
surrounding neighborhoods. To cover more neighborhoods, the vendors rotate between different
ferias in a pre-set pattern - typically setting up in the same location twice a week. For example,
they may sell at a first feria every Sunday and Wednesday, at a second feria every Tuesday and
Friday, and at a third feria every Thursday and Saturday. The group of vendors who move
together across neighborhoods is called a circuit. A semi-annual fee paid by the vendor to the
municipality covers her inclusion in the entire circuit, so the same group of vendors typically
rotate across neighborhoods all together. Vendors are not allowed to sell in public places other
than ferias.
Each municipality typically organizes one circuit of vendors. Large municipalities may have
more than one circuit. In such cases, the municipality area is divided in such a way that there
is no geographic overlap between circuits. Figures A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix provide visual
examples of ferias and circuits. Table C.1 describes observable characteristics of fish stalls in
7

ferias.

2.3

Experimental Design

This study was implemented in close collaboration with the Chilean National Fish Service (Sernapesca), who has the ultimate regulatory authority over fishing activities in the country. Our
implementing partner’s goal from this project was to limit hake fishing, sales and consumption
during the September ban. It is practically and politically very difficult for them to directly
regulate fishermen, because their activities occur out in the water at night, and because the
fishermen operating out of the geographically dispersed caletas are politically organized. Sernapesca therefore expressed an interest in exploring options to better regulate the fish sales at
ferias where hake is most commonly sold.

2.3.1

Sample

We conduct our experiment in the five central regions of Chile, which is home to 74% of the
Chilean population. The caletas located along the coastal villages and cities scattered across
these five regions account for 98% of all hake fish harvested in Chile. We conduct our experiment
in all ferias in these regions except for the city of Santiago.7
An important benefit of conducting the experiments at such a large and comprehensive
scale is that it allows us to track any displacement of illegal hake sales towards control markets,
because all potential markets (including ones where the interventions were not applied) are in
our database. This allows us to trace the market-level equilibrium effects of our interventions.
We collected data on the universe of circuits in our sample area, and from every fish vendor
operating in those circuits. We mapped all ferias served by each caleta where the fish are
caught. The unique long and thin geographic shape of Chile means that ferias are generally
located very close to the caletas from where they source fish (22 miles away on average). This

7

Santiago is unique in that there is one big centralized fish market called Terminal Pesquero Metropolitano
(TPM) where vendors buy from intermediaries to re-sell at neighborhood ferias. TPM is already well-monitored
by Sernapesca, and our interventions therefore did not need to be implemented there.
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made it relatively easy to connect vendors to the fishermen they source from, and trace how
the effects of our interventions are transmitted along the supply chain for hake fish.
There are 280 ferias (fish markets) operating in the 70 municipalities in our sample, and these
ferias are organized into 106 separate circuits. In order to identify and map all existing ferias
and circuits, we combined administrative data from multiple sources (Ministry of Economics
and Sernapesca) along with information gathered from phone conversations with staff in every
municipality. We then used Google Maps to define the consumer “catchment area” for each
feria. We identify the neighborhoods which are likely served by each feria, considering the
walking distance and road accessibility from the neighborhood to the feria, as well as the
residential versus commercial/industrial characteristics of the neighborhoods. The location of
the ferias and their organization as circuits were important for the design of our enforcement
intervention. The definitions of the residential neighborhoods and their connections to each
feria were important for the design of our consumer information campaign.

Interventions
This study experimentally evaluates the effects of two interventions that aimed to reduce illegal sales of hake during the September ban period. Enforcement targeted the supply of
hake by monitoring vendors and enforcing penalties on those found to be selling illegal hake.
The Information Campaign was designed to sensitize consumers about this environmental
problem and discourage hake consumption during the ban, in order to lower the demand for
hake.

2.3.2

Design of Enforcement Intervention

The supply-side enforcement intervention deployed government officials from Sernapesca to
periodically visit ferias where fresh hake is usually sold, and levy fines if vendors are caught
illegally selling hake during the September 2015 ban period. A enforcement visit consisted of
two Sernapesca officials visiting all fish stalls in a market. The officials were instructed to follow

9

the usual Sernapesca protocols to search for illegal fish at each stall.8 Our conversations with
vendors prior to September 2015 suggested that they were already well aware of the hake ban.
The most important change in 2015 compared to earlier years was that the enforcement activities were applied more consistently and regularly. As a part of this randomized controlled trial,
Sernapesca agreed to conduct this monitoring at specific locations and according to schedules
defined by the research team. Sernapesca shared the details about their monitoring activities
with the research team. The punishment for illegal sales is a US $200 fine plus confiscation of
the illegal fish. $200 is equivalent to two weeks of earnings for the average feria vendor, so this
represents a significant threat.
We anticipated that fish vendors would react to the enforcement activity by devising new
defensive strategies that would help them avoid paying fines. We introduced random variations
in enforcement policy design to investigate mechanisms that may be robust to agents’ efforts
to circumvent policy:
1. Predictability: We randomly varied the ease of predictability of the enforcement. In some
areas, Sernapesca monitors followed a consistent schedule (e.g. M,W at 9am) while in
other areas, they were asked to follow a less predictable schedule defined by the research
team. The research team randomly varied the day in which the visit is deployed in
any given week, keeping constant the total number. The latter is a more expensive
enforcement strategy because it requires having monitors on-call for longer windows.
This strategy was therefore practically more difficult for Sernapesca to implement.
2. Frequency: We randomly varied audit frequency at the circuit level, so that some groups
of vendors only received one visit per week, while others were visited multiple times at the
various locations in the city where they set up on different days of the week. Increasing
the frequency of monitoring visits is more expensive, but it may limit vendors’ ability to
relocate illegal hake sales spatially and inter-temporally during the week. On the other
8

The enforcement protocol used in September 2015 was ‘business as usual’, with no additional instructions
to the inspectors. The study design was negotiated at a higher level, and most of the inspectors did not know
about the existence (or aim) of the study. They merely followed instructions on where and when to visit markets.
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hand, it may also accelerate vendors’ learning about audit patterns, and deploy effective
defensive actions more quickly.
Enforcement activities were randomized at the circuit-level, covering all 106 market-circuits.
This randomization was stratified to ensure balance with respect to a few important spatial and
market characteristics: Whether the circuit (a) was located in a coastal municipality, (b) was
the only one operating in its municipality, and (c) served geographically isolated communities.

2.3.3

Design of Information Campaign

The demand-side intervention was a marketing campaign designed to inform consumers about
the September ban on hake sales. Sernapesca distributed letters, flyers and hanging posters in
the residential neighborhoods randomly assigned to this intervention. The message contained
in the flyers and posters was simple: “In September, Respect the Hake Ban.” The letter, signed
by the Director of Sernapesca, included three paragraphs. The first paragraph informed readers
about the hake ban every September. The second noted the decline in the hake population
to a critical level as a result of over-exploitation, and the third encouraged consumers to not
consume hake this month. Appendix A.3 shows samples of flyers and the letter. In previous
years, Sernapesca used a smaller budget to place informational ads in newspapers and highway
billboards. Information was distributed directly to consumers at a household level for the first
time in 2015.
Using our mapping exercise described in section 2.3.1, and combining it with the location of
major roads and crossings, we define boundaries of neighborhoods and divide the municipality
up such that the population-size of neighborhoods would be roughly equal. We conducted this
intervention in the 48 most populated municipalities and identified 270 distinct neighborhoods
in those municipalities. Figure A.7 provides example maps. The randomization procedure was
as follows:
1. First, 18 of the 48 most populated municipalities were assigned to a high saturation
information treatment, 17 to a low saturation information treatment, and the remaining
11

13 municipalities did not receive the letters, flyers or posters. “High saturation” was
defined to be a case where two-thirds of the neighborhood in the feria’s catchment area
would receive the letters, flyers, and posters. In the low saturation treatment area,
only one-third of the neighborhoods received those mailings. We randomly varied the
proportion of neighborhoods receiving the treatment to examine whether there are larger
changes in norms regarding the acceptability of inappropriate or socially harmful behavior
when households observe that many of their neighbors simultaneously receive the same
information about the illegality of hake consumption.
2. Second, specific neighborhoods within each high or low saturation information treatment
area were randomly chosen to receive the treatment.
3. Third, we randomly selected around 200 addresses in each of 102 neighborhoods, and
mailed out letters to each of those 20,400 addresses. 200 letters cover roughly 15% of
all potential addresses in a representative neighborhood. Based on information from the
postal service, we subsequently learnt that at least 13,000 letters were correctly delivered.9
80,000 flyers were distributed by trained field personnel to people walking in the streets,
and directly to households within the 102 treated neighborhoods. 3,000 posters were
placed around treated neighborhoods where they would be publicly visible, such as at
bus stations, community centers, and street intersections.

2.3.4

Cross-Randomized Experimental Design

The enforcement treatment and the information campaign were cross randomized in a 2x2
experimental design so that we could study potential complementarities between the two approaches. The first panel of the table 1 lists the number of circuits assigned to each of the four
treatment cells.

9

Although 13,000 were explicitly tracked, it is likely that around 16,500 were actually delivered, because the
postal service did not receive any delivery failure notice in those cases. We inferred and constructed addresses
using Google maps, and many of those addresses did not actually exist. That was a leading cause of delivery
failure.

12

Table 1: Treatment Assignment
No Enforcement

Enforcement

Total

No Information Campaign

9

41

50

Information Campaign

14

42

56

Total

23

83

106

z

}|

{

High Frequency

Low Frequency

Enforcement

Enforcement

Total

Predictable Enf. Schedule

19

20

39

Unpredictable Enf. Schedule

15

29

44

Total

34

49

83

Notes: The first panel shows the number of circuits assigned to each experimental cell jointly defined by the Information Campaign
(row) and the Enforcement treatment (column). The second panel shows the number of observations in each enforcement subtreatment.

The majority of markets were assigned to Enforcement because that column contains additional sub-treatments in which we conduct experiments on variation in enforcement policy
design. Those variations in predictability and frequency of enforcement visits were crossrandomized so that we have sufficient statistical power to study the effect of each variation,
one at a time. The scond panel of the table 1 shows the number of circuits assigned to each
sub-treatment cell. To study the effects of predictability of enforcement, we will compare the
39 circuits where Sernapesca monitored on a predictable schedule against the 44 circuits where
they monitored on an unpredictable schedule. Similarly, to study the effects of audit frequency,
we will compare the 34 circuits assigned to high-frequency against the 49 circuits assigned to
low-frequency.10
Tests of the information campaign saturation effect (i.e. proportion of neighborhoods around
markets that are simultaneously sent letters and flyers), will compare the 30 circuits randomly
assigned to a low-saturation campaign (where a third of neighborhoods received letters and
flyers), against the other 26 to a high-saturation campaign. We are able to control for other
10

The probability of assignment to low-frequency enforcement and to un-predictable schedules was a little
higher compared to other cells. In our analysis, we will control for these differences.
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dimensions of random assignment whenever we focus on the effects of one particular dimension.
Each of our treatments could have spillover effects on control markets, and we discuss those
issues in section 6.

3

Model of Enforcement

We formalize the decision-making process of a vendor who chooses whether to sell hake illegally,
in order to develop empirical predictions we test with daily data from markets. In the process,
we develop insights on the nature of learning and adaptation.

3.1

Setup

A risk-neutral vendor chooses whether to sell illegal hake in each period t ∈ N. Selling hake has
a fiduciary benefit of v > 0. Government inspectors periodically visit the vendor, and if hake is
detected, levies a monetary fine Ω > v. The vendor’s selling decision depends on her perceived
probability of receiving an enforcement visit that day, as well as on the likelihood of being fined
if visited. The vendor can adopt (costly) defensive actions to reduce the probability of being
fined if visited. yt is a Bernoulli random variable indicating whether there was an inspection
in period t, which occurs with a stationary probability θ > 0. Yt =

Pt−1

s=1

ys denotes the total

number of visits until period t − 1.
Updating of Beliefs θ is unknown to the vendor. She forms beliefs θ̂t about each day’s
visit probability on the basis of the history of visits (y1 , . . . , yt−1 ). We assume that the prior
θ̂1 is distributed Beta(α0 , α1 ). Since yt is Bernoulli, Bayesian updating implies θ̂t is distributed
Beta(α0 + Yt , α1 + t − 1 − Yt ), and E[θ̂t ] =

α0 +Yt
.
α0 +α1 +t−1

The perceived probability increases

with the share of periods in which the vendor has observed a visit in the past, adjusted by the
strength of her prior (which is parameterized by α0 and α1 ).
Defensive Actions If a vendor decides to sell, she could either sell the hake openly or adopt
costly defensive actions that reduce the probability of getting fined when inspected. If the
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vendor is inspected while selling openly, she is fined with probability one. The effectiveness
of defensive actions depends on how knowledgeable vendors are about loopholes in the audit
system. Vendors learn about enforcement loopholes as they receive visits.11 We denote the
probability of avoiding a fine through defensive actions g : N0 → (0, 1), where g(Yt ) is a strictly
increasing function of the past number of inspections.12 We assume that the vendor can never
make defensive actions completely foolproof, so limY →∞ g(Y ) = ḡ < 1.
Vendor’s Problem In every period, the vendor chooses whether to sell hake openly, defensively, or not at all. st = 1 indicates the vendor sells hake in t, and dt = 1 indicates the vendor
adopts the costly defensive action. We solve the vendor’s problem by backwards induction:
Conditional on Yt the vendor’s expected utility from each type of selling strategy:
h i

U [dt = 0|st = 1, Yt ] = v − ΩE θ̂t ;
h i

U [dt = 1|st = 1, Yt ] = v − ΩE θ̂t (1 − g (Yt )) − c .

Proposition 1 For any time t define the thresholds δ t =

c
Ωg(Yt )

and δ t =

v−c
.
Ω(1−g(Yt ))

Then

- When g(Yt ) ≤ vc , the vendor never adopts defensive actions. She sells openly if E[θ̂t ] ≤ Ωv ,
and does not sell if E[θ̂t ] > Ωv .
- When g(Yt ) >

c
,
v

the vendor sells hake openly if E[θ̂t ] ≤ δ t ; sells hake defensively if

δ t < E[θ̂t ] ≤ δ t ; and does not sell hake if E[θ̂t ] > δ t .
The proof of these results are in the Appendix. For Yt high enough, g(Yt ) > vc . As g(·) is
increasing; (i) once g(Yt ) >

c
v

this relation never reverses, and (ii) δ t is decreasing in Yt , and δ t

is increasing in Yt . Together, this implies that if it becomes sensible for the vendor to adopt the
costly defensive strategy in some period (given her beliefs), then that choice remains optimal
for all subsequent periods.
11

For example, if the vendor observes that the inspector is reticent to levy a fine when she freezes the hake
and claims it was caught in August, she will learn to adopt that strategy.
12
This model assumes the learning takes place regardless of the action chosen by the vendor. A more
sophisticated version could allow for action-dependent learning (bandit problem), which would add a dynamic
component. Assuming the learning is independent of the action seems somewhat realistic in our context, and
keeps the model simpler, preserving the key theoretical insights we can take to the data.
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The figure 1(a) provides a numerical example of the timing and scope of adoption of defensive
actions. In the early periods, the vendor lacks experience to sell defensively. Once the vendor
accumulates more experience (Yt increases), adopting defensive actions becomes more likely,
increasing the sale of hake. The figure 1(b) shows the overall sale of hake fish.
Figure 1: Probability of Selling Hake
(b) Selling Decision

(a) Adoption of Defensive Actions
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Notes: Figure E.2(a) and E.2(b) describe vendors’ decision on whether and how to sell. This simulation
 uses the same parameters
than previous graph: θ = 0.5, v ∼ U (0.5, 1.5), c = 0.1, Ω = 18, θ1 = 0.05, g(Y ) = 0.7/ 1 + e−2×Y +12 , i.e.,ḡ = 0.7. The adoption
of defensive strategies starts after a number of periods.

h i

Short versus Long Run In the long-run (as t → ∞), E θ̂t → θ, and vendor behavior is
governed only by the structural parameters of the model, and the learning dynamics become irrelevant. Incentives to sell are lowered with higher visit intensity θ, higher long-run enforcement
effectiveness in the presence of vendor adaptation 1 − ḡ, and lower demand for hake v.13
Our modeling focuses mostly on the short run learning and adaptation, because these are
the dynamics that we observe in our daily data collected during the hake ban in September. The
short run comparative statics depend heavily on the specific form of learning and adaptation,
g(·) and the vendor’s prior belief (α0 , α1 ). We focus on the most empirically relevant case for
hake sales in Chile, in which the vendor’s prior E[θ1 ] =

α0
α0 +α1

is diffuse (i.e., α1  α0 ), and she

does not know the loopholes in the audit system before receiving any monitoring visits from
this novel program we implement (i.e. g(0) is small).
Section 3.2 describes comparative statics of varying enforcement design in this setting.
13

The specific long-run conditions are discussed in Appendix D.2
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In particular, sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 discuss the implications of varying the frequency of
enforcement visits and the predictability of the enforcement schedule in our field experiment.

3.2

Enforcement and Learning

To perform the short-run comparative statics, we use the notation ∆xt = xt − xt−1 for any
variable x, to define the effect of increasing visit frequency:




∆ E[θ̂t ](1 − g(Yt )) = (1 − g(Yt−1 )) · ∆E[θ̂t ] − E[θ̂t−1 ] · ∆g(Yt ) − ∆E[θ̂t ] · ∆g(Yt )
≈ (1 − g(Yt−1 )) · ∆E[θ̂t ] − E[θ̂t−1 ] · ∆g(Yt )

(1)

There is a threshold for the number of visits Ȳ ∈ N0 14 such that increasing inspections
beyond Ȳ has ambiguous effects on the vendor’s propensity to sell. A new visit increases the
vendor’s perceptions about the probability of future visits (∆E[θ̂t ]), but also allows her to
acquire skills to circumvent the fine (∆g(Yt ) is weakly positive).15 At high values of Yt , a new
visit could inadvertently increase the vendor’s ability to sell hake illegally. Figure 1(b) simulates
the effect on overall sales, under specific parameter values. The propensity to sell decreases
immediately after the introduction of enforcement, but increases thereafter as vendors learn
how to circumvent the enforcement. We will examine these patterns using our daily data.

3.2.1

Effects of Frequency of Enforcement Visits

Increasing θ has two effects in equation (1): (a) the threshold Ȳ is reached faster, and (b) E[θ̂t ]
increases faster as well. Greater visit frequency gives the vendor more opportunities to learn
how to avoid paying the fine if inspected. The relative effectiveness of high versus low frequency
enforcement in the short-run will depend on the specific period when the comparison is made.
Figure 2 numerically simulates the model for high and low frequency of enforcement over 30
periods, under specific parametric assumptions described in Appendix E. Figures E.2(a) and
Defined as g(Y ) ≤ vc if and only if Y ≤ Ȳ . Such a Ȳ exists and is unique if learning is effective enough:
ḡ > c/v, and due to the fact that g(·) is increasing.
15
At Yt < Ȳ , the vendor has not yet learned enough and the defensive strategy is still ineffective, so extra
visits only disincentivizes hake sales through updates on E[θˆt ].
14

17

E.2(b) plot the vendor’s adoption of defensive strategies under those high and low frequency
enforcement scenarios. More intense enforcement initially reduces hake sales faster (as vendors
update more quickly about θ), but vendors also start adopting defensive actions earlier. This
makes high frequency enforcement relatively less effective in later periods.
Figure 2: Probability of Selling Hake
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Notes: This figure shows the proportion of times in which a vendor sells hake depending on the frequency of the visits. This graph
depicts 1000 simulations using the following model parameters θhigh = 0.5, θlow = 0.3, v ∼ U (1/2, 3/2), c = 0.1, Ω = 18, θ1 =
0.05, g(Y ) = 0.7/ (1 + exp {−2 · Y + 12}) , i.e., ḡ = 0.7. The probability of selling decreases quickly as the enforcement begins,
however it increases as vendors learn about enforcement weaknesses. After a number of periods, it converges to the “long-run”
equilibrium based on model’s structural parameters.

3.2.2

Predictability of Enforcement Visits

Vendors set up in different ferias on different days of the week, as described in section 2. If
auditors focus enforcement efforts in a single feria within a circuit, or on the same day of the
week, then their visit schedule becomes predictable. For simplicity, we assume that the circuit
rotates between two ferias f i , i = 1, 2, and in each period the vendor has the option to sell
once in each of them.16 At the beginning of each period, the vendor decides whether to sell in
each of the ferias. Beliefs about the likelihood of a visit θt now needs a superscript θti (i = 1, 2),
where i identifies each of two ferias. The vendor updates her beliefs about the probability of
a visit in each feria by looking only at the history of visits at that feria. Appendix D.1 details
why this corresponds to an optimal belief formation process. We define predictability of the
16

Modeling one feria per period (say, f 1 in odd and f 2 in even periods) yields the same qualitative insights.
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auditing schedule as follows:
Definition 1 A policy is predictable or targeted if either θ1 = 0 or θ2 = 0. A predictable
policy targets feria i if θ−i = 0. A policy is unpredictable if θ1 = θ2 .
Proposition 2 Define a fixed enforcement capacity Θ = θ1 + θ2 . When Θ is large enough, the
most effective policy in the long run is the unique unpredictable policy θ1 = θ2 , because that
deters sales in both ferias.17
Figure 3: Probability of Selling Hake
(b) Predictable vs. Unpredictable Enforcement

(a) Targeted vs. Non Targeted Ferias
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Notes: Figure 3(a) compares vendors’ decision in targeted and non targeted ferias, assuming that vendors alternate between these
ferias. The dashed line correspond to the average probability of sale, which is calculated assuming that in every period there’s one
half of the vendors in each type of feria. Figure 3(b) compares the average probability of selling under predictable vs. unpredictable
enforcement. These simulations use the following model parameters: θ = 0.4, v ∼ U (1/2, 3/2), c = 0.1, Ω = 18, θ1 = 0.05, g(Y ) =
0.7/ (1 + exp {−8 · Y + 28}) , i.e.,ḡ = 0.7.

With fixed enforcement capacity, learning occurs at the same rate under either a targeted
or an unpredictable policy. However, vendors are more likely to adopt defensive actions in the
targeted feria under the predictable policy, while the probability of selling in the non-targeted
feria inevitably will tend to one. We simulate the effects of predictable and unpredictable policies on hake sales in each feria in Figure 3(a). Vendor selling strategies diverge between the
targeted and non-targeted ferias, and under most functional forms, the unpredictable policy is

v−c
This is true for Θ ≥ 2δ ∞ , where δ ∞ = limYt →∞ δ t = Ω(1−ḡ)
(see Proposition 1). At lower enforcement
capacity, the regulator might do better by targeting a single feria, as explained in Appendix D.1
17
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more effective on average. Sales fall sharply immediately after the introduction of the enforcement, but this is only true for the targeted feria under the predictable policy. This is why the
predictable policy is less effective overall.

3.3

Model Predictions

The model provides specific empirical predictions that we can use our field experiment to test:
(1) Increasing the frequency of enforcement has ambiguous effects on sales in the short-run.
(2) Predictable enforcement is less effective in the short-run.
(3) The probability of selling is not stable, but varies over time as vendors learn and adapt.
(4) Vendors shift sales away from ferias targeted by enforcement schedule to non-targeted.
(5) Vendors exposed to enforcement will learn and adopt defensive actions after a few periods.
(6) The information campaign reduces hake sells both in the short-run and the long-run.

4

Data

We deployed “mystery shoppers” to surreptitiously gather information about hake availability
in fish markets, once during the ban (September 2015) before and after our interventions, and
again six months later in March 2016. We conducted two rounds of surveys of consumers during
those same two periods. We also surveyed fishermen at caletas and vendors at ferias to map the
fish supply chain and investigate spillovers. Figure 4 describes the timing of the interventions
and data collection activities. In total, seven different data sources are used in the analysis.
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Figure 4: Timeline of Interventions and Data Collection
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For us to reliably measure illegal activity, fish vendors cannot know that they are monitored.
This poses an interesting data collection challenge. To develop a strategy to address this
challenge, the research team visited dozens of ferias before the ban to understand the market
structure and relationships between vendors and consumers. We learned that vendors do not
know most shoppers, so an unfamiliar face will not necessarily raise suspicion. This made it a
good environment to deploy mystery shoppers and collect data surreptitiously. 29 enumerators
were trained to work as mystery shoppers. They were mostly women between the ages of 40 and
50, because this demographic group represents the typical feria customer profile. The mystery
shoppers were trained to look and act like ordinary shoppers, to pose as buyers and (try to)
purchase hake fish from the vendors. Mystery shoppers were not told the treatment status
of any market, to guard against the possibility that they inadvertently behaved differently in
treatment and control markets. They visited each circuit three times on average during the
September ban. We conducted an additional round of mystery shopper visits in March 2016 to
track longer term effects outside the intervention period.
These mystery shoppers gathered information on whether it was possible to buy hake, and
the market price of the fish. They also collected information on what else was available for sale
at the fish stalls and their prices, and to note down what was being purchased by other shoppers
in their presence. The visit protocol was piloted and refined through multiple pre-period visits
to ferias to make sure we elicited the required information without raising suspicion. Given
this methodology, we could not collect information about the total quantity of hake being sold,
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because that would be unnatural for a typical shopper to ask about, and it would have made
the vendors suspicious. The main outcome variable that this survey therefore produces is an
indicator for whether it was possible to buy hake at any particular stall. The mystery shoppers
also noted down general characteristics of the stall and vendor. They also wrote down notes on
the behavior of fish vendors, including conversations occurring in their presence. This is how
we learned about the practice of selling “frozen hake”, where the vendor kept the fish on ice
and claimed that it was caught legally in August. Many of those same vendors admitted to our
mystery shoppers that the “frozen” fish was in fact, fresh.

4.2

Identifying Defensive Strategies

Defensive strategies are at the heart of our theory on learning and adaptation. These are
normally difficult to observe because they are illegal and designed to be hidden. However,
our data collection strategy was designed to uncover such hidden actions. Mystery shoppers
uncovered two strategies most commonly used by vendors to circumvent enforcement: They
hide the hake they sell (instead of displaying it openly), and they put the fish over ice and
claim that it was caught legally in August, and frozen since then. There are other possible
illicit reactions that are impossible for mystery shoppers to observe safely, such as bribes paid
or threats issued during vendor-inspector interactions.

Hiding: Mystery shoppers were trained to ask vendors for hake even if it was not visibly on
sale in the stall. They noted down each occurrence of “hidden hake”, but we never shared the
specific vendor or feria identity with our government partners, so as to protect vendor privacy
and abide by our research ethics protocol. These data were very useful for the evaluation, but
were never used to target enforcement.
The hidden hake fish was often stored in a cooler behind the board that displayed the
stall’s fish prices. This is costly for vendors, because displaying the fish available for sale and
attracting customers’ attention are the main marketing tools at the vendors’ disposal. Many of
our mystery shoppers noted down in survey instruments that they observed regular consumers
22

asking vendors for hake when it was not visible. The hiding strategy evidently works because
many consumers are willing to partake.

Freezing: On paper, vendors are not allowed to sell hake fish in any form in September.
In practice, Sernapesca inspectors were more lenient with vendors who were detected selling
“frozen” hake. This is the practice of freezing the fish on ice and claiming that it was harvested
in August, before the ban. We had not anticipated this reaction, but a couple of our mystery
shoppers noted the practice for us early enough such that we were able to collect systematic
data on it. Matching our mystery shopper data at the daily level to the administrative data on
fines levied (from Sernapesca’s registry of inspector visits) suggests that inspectors were much
less likely to levy penalties when the vendor was claiming to sell “frozen” hake.
Selling frozen hake is costly for vendors because consumers prefer the taste of fresh fish,
and because freezing requires freezers and access to electricity. Using our other rounds of data,
we see that freezing is virtually non-existent during the rest of the year. So this does appear
to be a strategy that vendors use to circumvent the September ban.

4.3

Consumer Surveys at Fish Markets

We also surveyed consumers before and after the ban period. A separate team of enumerators
(distinct from our mystery shoppers) stopped consumers close the points of entry and exit for
the fish market, and asked questions with a survey instrument in hand. To encourage unbiased
responses, enumerators informed consumers that the survey was conducted by university-based
researchers, and that it aimed to gather information about food consumption in ferias. They
were not asked to provide any personal identifiable information, and we only inquired about the
list of food purchased in the feria in the past month - avoiding asking direct questions about
the consumption of hake. We also asked consumers to provide a sense of their home location
on a physical map we carried, so that we could match their residence to the neighborhoods
assigned to the information treatment.
In total, 3,300 consumers were surveyed in October 2015 through 54 enumerator visits, and
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3600 in March 2016 through 95 enumerator visits. This produces two rounds of a repeated
cross-section; the same consumers were not followed over time.

4.4

Survey of Vendors at Markets and Fishermen at Fishing Villages

We surveyed fish vendors in every market in our sample in June 2016, which is outside the hake
ban period. We asked vendors about the suppliers and intermediaries they source their fish
from, so that we could map out the supply chain. We also asked vendors about their contacts
with fish vendors who operate in other circuits, in order to study spillover and network effects.
To understand whether the effects of our interventions were transmitted upstream via the
supply chain, we conducted a survey of fishermen during July-August 2016 in every coastal
village in the region where hake fish is caught and distributed. We surveyed 231 fishermen
from 74 fishing villages (caletas). Figure A.4 in Appendix A.2 contains a map of all caletas and
fish markets.
Surveying fishermen was valuable for two reasons. First, the interventions were designed to
ultimately reduce illegal fishing, so understanding the activities of the fishermen is essential for
public policy. Second, the treatment effects may have spilled over to control areas if treatment
and control markets are served by the same fishing village. Understanding these supply-chain
connections are important for analyzing spillovers. Figure A.8 organizes our interventions and
data collection activities along the supply chain for fish.

5

Results

We report experimental treatment effects first, and then use the daily data to test the model’s
predictions on learning and adaptation. We registered this trial in the AEA registry before
data collection was completed. Our approach to analysis and the outcome variables we focus on
closely mirror the project narrative we uploaded before we had access to any data. We highlight
the most notable departures from the pre-analysis plan (PAP) in Appendix section G. We did
not delve into the details of testing a model of learning in the PAP. The various treatment arms
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appear well balanced in terms of baseline socio-economic and weather characteristics. Details
are provided in Appendix C.2.

5.1

Empirical Strategy

Mystery shoppers visited several stalls in each market multiple times in September 2015. These
visits created a stall-day level panel dataset of 906 visits. The first enforcement visit to various
markets by Sernapesca officers occurred between Sept 4 and 10. Our panel data consists of 242
visits during the pre-enforcement period, plus 664 visits during the post-enforcement period. We
use the following regression specification to evaluate the interventions, where each observation
refers to a mystery shopper visit at fish stall s, in feria f , from circuit c visited on day t:
ysf ct = β0 P ostt + β1 Tc + β2 Tc × P ostt + β3 ysf c0 + Xct 0 β4 + εsf ct

(2)

ysf ct is the outcome variable, such as an indicator for whether illegal hake fish was available at that stall on that day. The treatment assignment (Tc ) varies at the circuit level.
The variable P ostt indicates the post-intervention period, September 8-30.18 We control for
weather on each day, whether the inspector visited the market that day, a few socioeconomic
covariates (e.g. municipality crime rate), randomization strata fixed effects, and the baseline
(pre-intervention) value of the dependent variable. The error term, εsf ct , is clustered at the
circuit level, which was the unit of randomization. The coefficient of interest for the evaluation
is the parameter β2 , which captures the difference between treatment and control groups during
the post-intervention period. In most of our tables, we will only report the β2 coefficients, and
suppress all others.
To study consumer fish purchase behavior, we use surveys of consumers conducted at ferias.
We use the following regression specification to evaluate the effect of interventions, where each
observation refers to a to a single consumer i, surveyed in feria f , from circuit c:

18

Many of the information campaign letters arrived at households even after September 8. There are other
reasonable ways to define the post-intervention period, and we make a conservative choice. We have verified
that the exact definition of the post intervention period does not affect our main results.
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yif c = γ1 Tc + Xic 0 Γ + if c

(3)

Where yif c is the outcome variable, such as the number of times the consumer purchased
hake fish in the past month. Tc is the treatment status at the circuit level, and Xic represents a
set of covariates, including socioeconomic characteristics of the municipality, individual demographics (usual fish consumption, age, gender, and household income) and strata fixed effects.
Consumers are assigned treatment status based on the feria where they were interviewed.19
Standard errors are clustered at the circuit level.

5.2

Treatment Effects on Hake Sales Observed by Mystery Shoppers

Column 1 of Table 2 shows the effect of the interventions on whether fresh, visible hake was
available for sale in that stall, as detected by mystery shoppers. Column 2 shows effects on
whether hake in any form (fresh and visible, hidden in the back, or “frozen” hake that is kept
on ice) was available for sale. Each dependent variable is binary, and we report marginal
effects from a Probit regression. The table 2 presents the coefficients of interest of regression
equation 2, which track the effects of the demand-side information campaign, the supply-side
enforcement treatment, or the interaction between the two (ferias where both interventions
were simultaneously administered), during the post-intervention period.20
In column 1, vendors in markets exposed to the information campaign are 13.3 percentage
points less likely to be selling fresh, visible hake relative to control group vendors.21 This is
19

While that is the only sensible choice for the enforcement treatment, we could have also used the person’s
address to link them to the information treatment. Results look very similar either way, and we have imperfect
information on individual addresses, so we use the feria location.
20
We randomized the Information Campaign over the subset of the 48 most populous municipalities in our
sample (out of 70 total). We control for an indicator for these 48 municipalities in all our regressions. We have
also run regressions restricting the analysis sample to these 48 municipalities, and the results look very similar.
21
The “Information Campaign” group is a marker for circuits located in municipalities assigned to receive the
High-Saturation Information Campaign, where the majority of neighborhoods were treated with the campaign.
Appendix Table C.4 explains why we made this modeling choice. Our consumer survey data indicates that the
majority (69%) of shoppers we found shopping at ferias located in “control” neighborhoods in high-saturation
treatment municipalities resided in neighborhoods that were treated. It therefore makes more sense to code
such ferias as ‘treated’ with the information campaign. Appendix C.6 shows the results of re-estimating the
results in Tables 2, but reverting to coding ferias in control neighborhoods as not treated with information.
The results are qualitatively similar. The high-saturation information treatment has significantly larger effects
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Table 2: Treatment Effects on Hake Sales

VARIABLES

(1)
Fresh,
Visible Hake

(2)
Any Hake Available
(Hidden, Frozen, Visible)

-0.133
(0.066)
-0.178
(0.082)
-0.179
(0.074)

-0.131
(0.074)
-0.130
(0.089)
-0.139
(0.094)

-0.21
901

-0.36
901

Information Campaign Only
Enforcement Only
Info Campaign and Enforcement

Change in Dep. Var. in Control Group
During Intervention Period
N

Notes: This table reports the effect of each treatment arm on the availability of illegal hake fish. The variable Fresh Hake indicates
when the hake was available fresh. Hake available indicates when was possible to buy fish in any form. The table reports marginal
effects from a Probit regression. Other controls are included: municipality characteristics, strata fixed effects and the average level
of the outcome variable in pre-intervention period. We control for pre-treatment values for the outcome variables in addition to the
treatment indicator, because not all markets were visited in pre-intervention period. Robust standard errors clustered by circuit
(the unit of randomization) in parentheses.

quite a large effect, considering that about 43% of vendors in control markets were selling
hake before the interventions were launched. Vendors operating in markets where Sernapesca
monitors visit to levy penalties become 17.8 percentage points less likely to sell fresh, visible
hake. The combination of the two treatments also produces a 17.9 percentage point decrease
in hake availability, so there is no evidence that the information campaign complements the
enforcement strategy to make it more effective.
When we add “hidden” and “frozen” hake to fresh/visible hake sales in column 2 to create
a broader dependent variable that captures any type of hake sales, the enforcement treatment
effects become smaller and lose statistical significance. Taken together, the two columns suggest
that while the interventions reduced vendors’ propensity to engage in illegal activity that could
be easily monitored by regulators (visible sales in column 1), it is not so clear whether it actually
reduced the underlying environmental harm that we care about (column 2). The reduction in
the size of the treatment effect moving from column 1 to 2 stems from the defensive strategies
that vendors adopt in response to the audits.22
on hake sales than the low-saturation treatment.
22
It is curious that the control group experienced larger reductions in “any hake” (column 2) than in “fresh,
visible hake” (column 1). This is because a few control group vendors practiced freezing during the pre-
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5.3

Consumer Behavior

We consider the mystery shopper data to provide the most reliable measure of illegal behavior,
but the consumer surveys at markets allows us to report changes in purchase patterns during
the ban. The first column of Table 3 shows treatment effects on the number of times that
consumers report buying hake fish during the previous month. The reported coefficients are
marginal effects from a Poisson regression, evaluated at the mean of all covariates. We see
significant decreases in (self-reported) hake purchase across all treatment arms, and so results
are generally consistent with the mystery shopper survey. However, in these consumer reports,
the treatment effects appear larger in information campaign areas where purchases decrease by
50% compared to the control group. This may be because the direct communication consumers
received through the information treatment created some self-reporting bias.
Table 3: Treatment Effects on Fish Consumption

VARIABLES

(1)
(2)
Num. Times Hake Mention Ban
Purchased
(unprompted)

Information Campaign Only
Enforcement Only
Info Campaign and Enforcement

Mean Dep Var Control Group
N

-0.275
(0.071)
-0.111
(0.049)
-0.098
(0.046)

0.146
(0.045)
0.082
(0.047)
0.107
(0.051)

0.49
3218

0.07
3319

Notes: This table presents the effect of different treatments on the reported consumption of hake fish during September 2015.
The column 1 shows the marginal effects from a Poisson regression because the dependent variable is count data, the column 2
shows marginal effects from a Probit regression. Consumers were not asked about the ban, but surveyors registered if the ban
was mentioned spontaneously. These regressions include socioeconomic characteristics and strata fixed effects. The numbers of
observations in columns 1 and 2 differ because some consumers could not recall the number of times they purchased hake in the
past month. Both Poisson and Probit are nonlinear models, and the average marginal effects of each treatment depend not only
on the coefficients reported in this table, but also on the values of the covariates. Robust standard errors clustered by circuit in
parentheses.

Consumer behavior was also indirectly influenced by the enforcement activity. Not only
intervention period (first week of September), but they stopped doing so after the interventions started. Apparently vendors in the control group learnt that there would not be much enforcement in their ferias, and reacted
accordingly.
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did self-reported hake purchases decrease there relative to control markets, the third column
also shows that consumers were about twice as likely (or 8-11 percentage points more likely)
to mention to our enumerators, totally unprompted, that they did not buy hake because there
was a September ban in place. Our enumerators did not ask consumers any questions about
the ban, but were instructed to note down whenever a consumer spontaneously mentioned the
ban. Consumers treated with the information campaign were 15 percentage points more likely
to mention the September ban unprompted, so evidently the treatments were at least successful
in spreading more information and awareness relative to control areas.

5.4

Variations in the Design of the Enforcement Strategy

We experimentally manipulated the enforcement schedule in two dimensions: Predictability and
Frequency. Table 4 uses the mystery shopper data, and repeats the regression setup of Table
2, except that the enforcement treatment is now sub-divided into areas where the monitoring
schedule was either predictable or unpredictable (column 1), or sub-divided into areas where
monitoring was conducted at high versus low frequency (column 2). These provide direct tests
of Predictions (1) and (2) highlighted in Section 3.2.2.
The first column shows that the enforcement strategy was more effective when it was unpredictable. When enforcement follows a predictable schedule (e.g. every Tuesday at 10am), its
effect is not statistically different than zero. However, when we make the monitoring visit schedule difficult for vendors to predict, we see that there is a much larger and statistically significant
decrease of 19 percentage points in vendors’ propensity to sell hake, even after we account for
vendor defensive reactions like hiding and freezing. The effect of the unpredictable schedule is
statistically significantly larger than predictable enforcement. The lack of predictability makes
it difficult for vendors to anticipate the visit pattern and deploy effective defense.
The second column shows results separately for the subgroup of vendors who received monitoring visits once a week (low frequency), and other vendors who were visited twice a week,
which means that monitors followed a circuit around in the different market locations where

29

Table 4: Treatment Effect on Hake Sales by Enforcement Strategy
(1)

(2)
Any Hake Available
(Fresh, Visible, Hidden or Frozen)

VARIABLES
Information Campaign only
Enforcement on Predictable Schedule
Enforcement on Unpredictable Schedule

-0.134
(0.073)
-0.060
(0.083)
-0.192
(0.094)

High Frequency Enforcement

-0.135
(0.072)

-0.070
(0.095)
-0.162
(0.090)

Low Frequency Enforcement

p-value of Predictable = Unpredictable Sch.
p-value of Low = High Int. Enf.
Change in Dep Var in Control
During Intervention
N

0.036
0.280
-0.36
901

-0.36
901

Notes: This table presents the coefficient corresponding to the interaction term Tc × P ostt for each treatment. To retain statistical
power, the cells “Enforcement only” and “Enforcement + Info Campaign” from Table 2 are combined under “Enforcement” and
then sub-divided by schedule predictability (column 1), or intensity (column 2). So these coefficients should be interpreted as the
average effects of enforcement when half the sample is also exposed to the information campaign. Note that we previously find
evidence of null interaction effect between enforcement and info campaign (Muralidharan et al., 2019). Column 1 includes a dummy
for the intensity sub-treatment, and column 2 includes a dummy for the predictability sub-treatment, but those coefficients are
not shown. Each regression controls for the dependent variable in pre-intervention period, strata fixed effects and municipality
characteristics. Probit regression marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors clustered by circuit in parentheses..

those vendors set up stalls on different days of the week (high frequency). The high frequency
visits in principle limit opportunities for spatial and temporal displacement of illegal hake
sales. The strategy of devoting additional resources to enforce at high frequency backfired.
Enforcement is more effective at reducing hake availability in markets that were visited less frequently. Although the 9.2 percentage point gap between low and high frequency is meaningful
in magnitude, it is not statistically significant.

5.5

Evidence on the Process of Learning and Adaptation

Number of Visits: In this section, we study some of the specific theoretical predictions on
how vendors learn and adapt to enforcement by merging our daily data collected via mystery
shoppers with the administrative data from Sernapesca inspectors. Observations made by
mystery shoppers at a specific feria on a given day are linked to the history of enforcement
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visits in that feria and circuit. Appendix C.1.4 describes Sernapesca’s enforcement activities
in more detail. We organize the data this way to test Prediction (3) from Section 3.2.2 that
vendors’ propensity to sell would not remain stable as they learn about enforcement and adapt.
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Figure 5: Hake Available
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Notes: This figure shows how the sale of hake evolved week by week. The graph plots the coefficients of the treatment-week
interactions. Each relevant coefficient is normalized relative to the first week. We exclude the first three days of the month to keep
the weeks balanced, i.e., the first week starts on Sept 4th and ends on Sept 10th. Each regression controls for crime rate and strata
fixed effects and the average outcome variable before the implementation. We cluster standard errors at the circuit level.

Figure 5 compares the week-to-week behavior of vendors exposed to different frequencies of
enforcement. Consistent with the theory of learning, the two treatments produce similar effects
at the beginning of the month, but effects diverge over time. Vendors exposed to higher visit
frequency sell more hake, not less by the end of the month. This is consistent with the idea
that more interactions with auditors allow vendors to learn about enforcement loopholes and
adopt defensive strategies.
Figure 6 plots the likelihood of selling hake on a given day as a function of the number of
inspections received at that feria until that day.23 We see that receiving more visits reduces
the probability of selling over time. However, the effect is non-linear: Earlier visits have a
larger effect on reductions in hake sales than subsequent visits. This is especially true in the
23

The estimates are obtained from the following regression specification:
Ysf ct =

N
X


βnP × 1(#Enfct = n) × P redc + βnU × 1(#Enfct = n) × U nP redc + Xct 0 Γ + εsf ct

(4)

n=0

The term 1(#Enfct = i) indicates circuits that have been visited n times by Sernapesca officials at the
moment the secret shopper collected the data.
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Notes: This figure shows how the sale of hake depends on the number of visits received until (including) the day the mystery
shopper observed the behavior of the vendor. The horizontal line at -0.36 serves as a reference for the decrease in the probability of
selling hake in the control group. This specification controls for crime rate, strata fixed effects, and the average outcome variable
before the implementation. We cluster standard errors at the circuit level.

experimental arm with a predictable visit schedule. This differential effectiveness over time in
the predictable arm was also evident in the theoretical simulations [Figures E.4(a) and E.4(b)].
The intuition is that vendors learn that one of the ferias where they sell is not being targeted,
and continue selling illegally at that location.

Schedule of Visits: We test this intuition directly in Appendix C.3 using within-circuit
variation to study whether the same vendor shifts sales to non-targeted days and markets.
Each fish vendor rotates between ferias within a circuit on different days of the week in a
pre-determined pattern. We see substantial evidence supporting the this form of day-of-week
displacement (model Prediction (4)).
In Appendix Table C.10, vendors who experienced inspections in different ferias on different
days of the week (DOWs) reduce hake sales by an extra 9 percentage points (p-val<0.01) in
the second half of the month, relative to vendors who were targeted at a single feria always on
the same DOW. Furthermore, Tables C.11 and C.12 study vendors’ decisions to sell hake in
the non-targeted feria in the second half of the month in circuit-fixed-effects regressions. We
see that the same vendor sells more at markets and weekdays where she did not experience a
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visit, relative to another market/weekday where she did, and is also more likely to shut down
her stall entirely in the “targeted” market.
This behavior closely resembles the theoretical simulations displayed in Figure 3, where we
explain how the shift in sales towards non-targeted ferias results in the relative ineffectiveness
of the predictable schedule of enforcement. We relegate this “within-circuit” evidence to the
appendix, because Sernapesca chose which feria to visit within each circuit partly based on
logistical considerations, and this variation therefore cannot be treated as random.

Defensive Strategies We now study defensive strategies highlighted in Prediction (5) in
section 3.2.2. Our mystery shoppers collected systematic data on vendors’ propensity to sell
“hidden” fish from the back that was not displayed at the stall, and “frozen” fish that they
claimed was caught in August. Hiding was clearly used as a defensive strategy to circumvent
the September ban: we conducted another mystery shopper survey six months after the ban,
and we did not observe even a single stall selling fish that was not publicly visible at that
time. There are several pieces of circumstantial evidence in our data that freezing is also
pretense; that fishermen and vendors are not actually protecting the environment by catching
fish in August and freezing it until September. First, we document more freezing in the second
half of September 2015 than during the first half, after vendors have had a chance to learn
about the enhanced regulatory activities. Real freezing would have been much less costly to
engage in during the first half of the month. Second, we collected data on stall characteristics,
and availability of a freezer in a stall is not at all predictive of freezing. If anything, our
mystery shoppers find that stalls without freezers are more likely to be selling frozen fish postintervention. Third, many secret shoppers noted down that in their conversations with vendors,
many vendors admitted (and even insisted) that the fish was fresh even though it was labeled
as frozen.
Figure 7 shows the prevalence of freezing and hiding across treatment groups. We divide
up the control group into markets that have another circuit that is randomly assigned to
enforcement within 10 kilometers (to capture any information spillovers), and pure control
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Figure 7: Hidden and Frozen Hake Fish

Notes: This figure shows the unconditional mean of hidden hake for different treatment status. The level of frozen hake is
statistically different from zero for markets assigned to Enforcement and Enforcement and Info Campaign. The level of hidden is
statistically different from zero for markets with Enforcement and spill-overs. Standard errors are not shown in the figure, but the
accompanying text describes p-values of relevant comparisons.

markets that are more than 10km away from any treated area. Several notable patterns emerge:
1. We do not observe any hiding or freezing at all in pure control markets in the post intervention period. In contrast, 7.2% vendors operating in circuits that received Sernapesca
inspector visits sell frozen fish (p-value <0.01), and 3.2% of those vendors engage in
hidden hake sales (p-value 0.01).
2. Vendors operating in circuits exposed only to the information campaign did not engage
in any hiding or freezing at all. Vendors (sensibly) employ these defensive strategies only
against Sernapesca inspectors, not informed consumers. Evidently there is something
fundamentally different about targeting the demand side: The information campaign did
not simply signal enhanced government attention to the problem. The consumers are
an important independent actor whose knowledge affects vendor behavior. This result
also explains why the enforcement strategy appeared to produce larger decreases in fresh,
visible hake sales than the information campaign (column 1 of table 2), but not once you
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take vendor defensive strategies into account (column 2).
3. 4% of vendors who operate in control markets - but located close to treated areas - engage
in hiding and freezing, in contrast to 0% in pure control markets (p-value 0.02). There
appear to be some spatial spillovers in information about Sernapesca visits, and in vendor
behavior. We will explore these spillovers at greater depth in Section 6.
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Notes: Figure 8 describes the conditional probability of selling hake either frozen or hidden. The coefficients were obtained from an
OLS regression over the sample of the stalls selling hake that day. Each treatment assignment interacts with weekly dummies. We
include strata fixed effects and cluster at the circuit level. The "No Enforcement" category is the omitted category, and it bunches
observations assigned to the control group and the information campaign. To facilitate visual interpretation, we only present the
confidence intervals associated with weeks one and four.

Figure B.1 shows that the proportion of hake vendors who adopt these defensive strategies
increase week-to-week in response to the enforcement activities. Figure 8 describes the proportion of all hake sold in frozen or hidden form (as opposed to fresh, visible form), within the set
of stalls that sell hake at all. Freezing and hiding were extremely unusual at the beginning of
the month. Vendors exposed to Sernapesca enforcement increasingly adopted these defensive
strategies week to week, vendors not exposed to enforcement did not. By the end of the month,
nearly 70% of the stalls selling hake in the enforcement areas hid or froze. Consistent with
model Prediction (5), these data strongly suggest that these were indeed defensive strategies
employed in response to enforcement.
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Finally, consistent with Prediction (6), the information campaign reduces hake sales even
after accounting for defensive strategies (as already shown in Table 2), and consumer surveys
conducted again 6 months after the ban ends (see table C.14) shows that the demand-side
effects somewhat persist over the long run.

6

Spillovers and Market Level Effects

While our experiment was targeted to reduce hake sales in treated ferias, it may have had
spillover effects on control markets through information transmission, or by changing equilibrium prices (Blattman et al., 2017). It may also have affected the behaviors of other market
actors, such as the fishermen who supply to vendors. It could have also changed the prices
and quantities of other fish that can act as substitutes for hake. We collected additional data
to study these spillovers and equilibrium effects, including a survey of fishermen, a survey of
vendors to understand their social and supply-chain connections to vendors operating in other
markets, GIS data on the location of all markets, and data on the prices and availability of
substitute fish. The vendor and fishermen surveys allow us to map the supply chain for each of
the ferias in our sample. The geography of Chile (with a very long coast) creates large spatial
variation in the locations of ferias where vendors sell and caletas where the fishermen bring
in their catch, which in turn produces variation in geographic and social connections between
different market actors (see Figure A.4).

6.1

Spillovers on Control Markets

We identified three primary channels through which treatment may affect behavior of control
markets, and collected data on each channel:
1. Spatial spillover: Control markets located geographically close to a treated market may
feel the effects of treatment because they share consumers with the treated area.
2. Social spillover: If control market vendors are socially connected to vendors operating
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in treatment areas, they may be more likely to learn about Sernapesca’s enforcement
activities.
3. Supply chain spillover: Treatment and control vendors may source from the same fishermen. If a supplier changes fishing behavior due to treatment, that could indirectly affect
fish sales in control markets.
Of these different channels, an increase in fish sales in control markets due to indirect effects
is of greatest econometric concern. If fishermen dump all excess hake in control markets when
vendors in treated markets are unwilling to buy hake, then the treatment-control difference
will appear to show that the treatment was effective, when in fact hake sales were simply
spatially displaced towards the control group. Our regressions would over-estimate the effects
of treatment in that scenario. This is why it’s important for us to re-investigate these effects
controlling for these sources of spillovers.
In Table 5, we re-estimate the effects of predictable and un-predictable enforcement originally reported in Table 4, but now controlling for potential channels of spillover effects.24 The
main treatment effects get a little stronger after controlling for spillovers, but the spillover
effects are only suggestive and statistically imprecise.
The first column presents the benchmark: unpredictable enforcement reduces hake availability by 15.7 percentage points in this specification without accounting for any spillover. The
second column controls for spatial spillovers, with the indicator “within 10km of Treated Market” turning on for untreated markets that have at least one treated feria within a distance of

24

We follow a procedure similar to Miguel and Kremer (2004) in estimating treatment effects in the presence
of spillovers. We divide the control markets into subgroups; (a) Control areas that are more likely to have
been affected by treatment due to geographic or social or supply chain connections, which we call “Spillover
Group”, and (b) Control areas un-connected to treatment markets, which we call “Pure Control”. Note that
sub-dividing the control group this way reduces the number of markets allocated to the omitted category.
To retain sufficient statistical power, we therefore focus on re-estimating the effects of enforcement treatment
variations only, because spillovers cause the greatest econometric concern (of over-estimating treatment effects)
for this particular result. In this setup, some of the markets in the omitted category received the information
treatment, so the regression coefficients will look a little smaller in this table compared to Table 4. For the same
statistical power reasons, we only study an overall spillover effect of enforcement, and do not try to estimate
separate sub-treatment spillovers.
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Table 5: Treatment Effects on Hake Sales Controlling for Spillovers to Control Markets
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
Any Hake Available
(Fresh, Visible, Hidden or Frozen)

VARIABLES
Enforcement on Predictable Schedule
Enforcement on Unpredictable Schedule
Spatial Spillover
(within 10 km of Treated market)
Social Connection Spill-over
(Vendor knows a Treated Vendor)
Supply-Chain Spill-over
(Sources from same Caleta as Treated Vendor)
Change in Dep Var in Control During Intervention
N

-0.023 -0.030 -0.076 -0.058
(0.083) (0.069) (0.080) (0.060)
-0.157 -0.167 -0.199 -0.177
(0.091) (0.075) (0.084) (0.084)
-0.017
(0.082)
-0.071
(0.076)
-0.077
(0.081)
-0.36
901

-0.36
901

-0.36
901

-0.36
901

Notes: This table re-estimates treatment effects controlling for possible spillover effects from treatment to control markets. We
focus on enforcement treatments to ensure that the control cell size is large enough to be divided by exposure to spill-overs. We
only present the coefficient corresponding to the interaction term Tc × P ostt for each treatment. Controls for Tc , P ostt , covariates,
and baseline value of the dependent variable are included, but those coefficients are not shown. The table reports marginal effects
from a Probit regression. The dependent variable is an indicator for any type of hake (fresh-visible, hidden or frozen) for sale in
the stall. Robust standard errors are clustered by circuit, which was the unit of randomization. .

10 kilometers.25

26

The coefficient of this variable is negative but small and statistically in-

distinguishable from zero, suggesting very limited spillovers based on shared consumers due to
geographic proximity. The third column includes an indicator for control markets where at least
one vendor reported that they knew a vendor in a different market that was randomly assigned
to the enforcement treatment. The coefficient on this variable suggests that there was a 7 percentage reduction in hake availability in markets experiencing this “social spillover”, but this
effect cannot be statistically distinguished from a null effect with any confidence. Controlling
for this form of spillover increases the effect of unpredictable enforcement to a 19.9 percentage
point reduction in hake availability (p < 0.05). Finally, column 4 includes an indicator for
control markets who source from fishermen operating out of caletas that primarily supply to

25

Using the 10 km radius evenly divides the control group into “pure control” and “spill-over market”, and
therefore maximizes statistical power. Alternative definitions produce similar results.
26
Vendors connected to a larger number of other circuits are more prone to being exposed to the treatment,
and that variation is not random. To control for this, we include a full set of dummy variables for the number
of other circuits that each reference circuit is connected to, separately for spatial, social and supply-chain
connections. Thus, the variation of exposure to spillovers stems only from the treatment status of other markets,
which is exogenous because it was randomly assigned. (Miguel and Kremer, 2004).
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other markets that were assigned to the enforcement treatment. We see a 7.7 percentage point
reduction in vendors’ propensity to sell hake in control markets that are connected to treated
markets through shared suppliers, but the effect is again not statistically precise.
Importantly, accounting for these spillover effects make the main treatment effects of unpredictable enforcement on enforced areas a little larger and more statistically precise. This
is because controlling for spillovers allow us to compare treated areas to the subset of “pure”
control areas unaffected by the treatment.

6.2

Change in Number of Stalls Selling Fish

Our intervention may force some fish vendors to exit the market altogether. Appendix Figure
B.2 shows that the average number of fish stalls decreases in the markets randomly assigned
to the enforcement treatment, especially during the second half of September. This itself is an
important effect of the treatment, but it is not captured by the treatment effects reported in
Table 2. Table C.13 in Appendix C.4 describes how we correct our estimates for stalls exiting.
The correction makes the effect of enforcement larger, but it does not affect the coefficients for
other treatments very much.

6.3

Treatment Effect Transmission along the Supply Chain

For the supply chain spillover channel to be relevant, the fishermen supplying hake to these
vendors must have altered their behavior in some way. To understand those changes, we
directly survey fishermen operating out of every caleta (fishing village) that serves the markets
in our sample.27 The reactions of fishermen are particularly important to track because our
interventions conducted at the final point-of-sale has to somehow get transmitted up the supply
chain to fishermen, for these interventions to ultimately protect the hake population. Only if
fishermen start perceiving the effects of these interventions on demand conditions will they
change fishing behavior in ways that improve environmental outcomes.
27

A few caletas in the regions covered by our sampling frame are only used by divers who harvest seafood,
not fish -and we therefore exclude those caletas.
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Since we did not have baseline data from fishermen for years preceding the September 2015
ban, we ask them retrospective questions in 2016, in which the fishermen are asked to compare
demand and profits during September 2015 (when our interventions were launched) relative
to September 2014. To minimize possible response bias given the government fishing ban, we
were careful to phrase our questions generically, to cover revenues earned from all types of
fish, and not just hake specifically. Retrospective answers may be subject to recall bias, but
since these fishermen were not directly treated, it is less likely that the recall bias is correlated
with treatment assignment. To report treatment effects on fishermen, we have to connect each
caleta to treatment and control markets. We use the vendor survey on the structure of the
supply chain -i.e. which caletas each vendor buys from - to link fishermen to the randomized
treatments.
Table 6: Treatment Effect Transmission to Fishermen in Caletas

VARIABLES
At least one circuit Enforced
Info Campaign
At least one circuit Enforced and Info Campaign

(1)
Earned Less in
Sept 15 than
Sept 14

(2)
(3)
Feria Vendors buy
Consumers are
less Hake in Sep15 informed of Hake
compared to Sept 14
Ban

0.238
(0.105)
0.043
(0.158)
0.358
(0.128)

0.169
(0.293)
-0.101
(0.322)
0.553
(0.315)

-0.033
(0.147)
0.343
(0.186)
0.173
(0.195)

0.31
202

0.40
179

0.77
217

Mean Dep Var Control Group
N

Notes: This table reports OLS coefficients based on fishermen responses. The variable Information campaign correspond to caletas
located in municipalities assigned to receive any level of information campaign. The variable “At least one circuit enforced” considers
all circuits located in the same municipality of the caleta. Socioeconomic variables of the caletas are included as covariates. In
average, three fishermen were surveyed in each caleta. The numbers of observations in columns 1, 2 and 3 differ because some
fishermen could not recall the earnings and vendor behavior in specific months. The dependent variables of each column are dummy
variables. Robust standard errors clustered at caleta level in parentheses.

Table 6 reports results. Column 1 shows that fishermen operating out of caletas that sell
to at least one circuit which had been randomly assigned to enforcement, are 24 percentage
points more likely to report that they earned less in September 2015 from all fishing activities
compared to September 2014, relative to fishermen in caletas that supply to control group
ferias.28 Fishermen operating out of caletas that supply to both enforced markets and to
28

We could instead define exposure based on the proportion of circuits enforced, and results look similar.
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markets that experienced the information campaign were 36 percentage points more likely to
report lower revenues during the month of the interventions, compared to the same month in the
previous year. Treatment effects were perceived by fishermen upstream in the fish supply chain.
Column 2 shows that these fishermen are more likely to report that vendors were less willing
to buy hake in September 2015 compared to the previous year, but this result is marginally
significant with (p < 0.10). Column 3 shows suggestive evidence (p < 0.10) that fishermen
linked to the information campaign areas are more likely to report that final consumers are
aware of the hake ban.

6.4

Effects on Fish Substitutes

We collected data on prices and availability of other fish species in the same markets where
hake is sold. The September ban is only specific to hake fish, so we might expect consumers
to substitute to other fish varieties. This may be because informed consumers choose to avoid
hake fish during the ban, or because the enforcement treatment reduces hake availability or
increases its price.
The universe of data from all markets suggests that there are seven possible fish substitutes
for hake,29 but a typical stall only offers two or three varieties of fish. Table C.2 in the Appendix
describes the availability and price of different fish species observed by mystery shoppers in ferias
during September 2015. The most common fish substitute is pomfret, which can be found in
two-thirds of all markets. Pomfret is larger and (arguably) more tasty than hake fish and is
not over-exploited. In Table 7, we study the availability of pompfret (column 1), or any other
non-hake fish including pomfret (column 2), as a function of the treatment status of the market
where the fish stall is located.
The penultimate row of the table indicates that stalls in control markets are 29 percentage
points more likely to start selling pomfret during the September hake ban, so it appears that
The “at least one” formulation is attractive because this indicator evenly divides the sample into equal halves.
29
They are pomfret, mackerel, silverside, salmon, sawfish, albacore and southern hake. Of these substitutes,
the southern hake is the only one with a similar ban, but in August. The southern hake is considerably larger
than the common hake and is harvested in the southern regions of the country, without any geographical overlap
with the common hake. More details are available in Subpesca (2015).

41

Table 7: Do Vendors Substitute to Selling Other Fish in Response to Treatment?
VARIABLES

(1)
Pomfret Available

(2)
Any Other Fish Available

0.146
(0.098)
0.133
(0.079)
0.115
(0.078)

0.004
(0.035)
0.027
(0.031)
0.065
(0.033)

0.29
901

0.09
6328

Information Campaign Only
Enforcement on Predictable Schedule
Enforcement on Unpredictable Schedule

Change in Dep Var in Control Markets
During Intervention
N

Notes: The table reports marginal effects from a Probit regression. The unit of observation in the first column is stall x secret
shopper visit, and in the second column is stall × secret shopper visit × possible substitute fish variety. We only present the
coefficient corresponding to the interaction term Tc × P ostt for each treatment. Controls for Tc , P ostt , covariates, and baseline
value of the dependent variable are included, but those coefficients are not shown. Robust standard errors are clustered by circuit
in parentheses.

vendors in general move towards substitutes during the ban. The increase in pomfret sales
during September is larger in treated areas (by a further 12-15 percentage points, which results
in a 41-44 percentage point increase during the hake ban), but the treatment-control differences
are barely statistically significant.30 The p-value for only one of the three coefficients (associated
with Predictable Enforcement) is below 0.10. Column 2 investigates treatment effects on the
vendor’s decision to offer each of seven different fish substitutes for hake. The sample size
is larger in this regression because selling each fish variety is treated as a separate decision,
but our standard errors are still clustered by the unit of randomization of the treatment (the
circuit). The coefficients indicate that vendors who faced unpredictable enforcement become
15.5 percentage more likely to switch to selling other fish during the hake ban, compared to the
9 percentage point increase in control markets. This 6.5 percentage point treatment-control
difference is statistically significant (p=0.051).

30

Consumers are more prone to substitute products at similar price levels (see Table C.2). The hake is
considerably cheaper than the pomfret and other relevant fish species. This fact may have limited the willingness
to substitute for different fish species.
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6.5

Effects on Prices

We collected data on fish prices during all our mystery shopper visits. However, prices are
observed only when the fish is available for sale and hake is only available in 26% of markets.
Treatment changes the propensity to sell illegal hake fish, so it affects the selection of which
prices are observed. There are therefore large sample-selection issues that complicates any
analysis of treatment effects on prices, and we refrain from running regressions on the price of
hake. The most consumed fish during September (and second most consumed fish during the
rest of the year) is Pomfret, which is available in 68% of the stalls (see Appendix Table C.2).
Since pomfret is more often available (and not banned), we instead run regressions to study
treatment effects on the price of pomfret.
As a descriptive exercise, Figure B.3 shows that the price of hake increased week-to-week in
September, over the course of the ban period. Pomfret prices fell by 10% in the second week and
that lower price remained stable thereafter. This time-series pattern in prices is consistent with
fishermen upstream in the supply chain shifting away from hake and towards catching pomfret
during our interventions in September 2015. Through conversations with fishermen during our
survey, we learned that they are able to adjust their fishing strategy to target different species
if there are market signals that hake demand is low. To do so, they change the location and
depth at which their nets are dropped.
Table 8 shows treatment effects on pomfret prices (column 1) and prices of all substitute fish including pomfret (column 2). We find that the price of substitutes weakly increase
(p − value < 0.1) in markets where the information campaign discouraging hake consumption
in surrounding neighborhoods, suggesting that part of the demand for hake shifted towards
substitutes. Relative to the control group, markets that received enforcement show small and
insignificant price decrease. The fact that we observe these differential price effects suggests
that fish markets are at least somewhat segmented.
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Table 8: Treatment Effect on Fish Prices
VARIABLES

(1)
Log Price Pomfret

(2)
Log Price Substitute

0.210
(0.109)
-0.017
(0.066)
0.081
(0.065)

0.140
(0.096)
-0.021
(0.055)
0.047
(0.059)

-0.20
614

-0.27
939

Information Campaign Only
Enforcement Only
Info Campaign and Enforcement

Change in Dep Var in Control
During Intervention
N

Notes: The table reports treatment effects on hake substitutes’ price from OLS regressions. The outcome variable is the log
of price per kilo. The unit of observation in the first column is stall with pomfret available × secret shopper visit, and in the
second column is stall with any substitute available × secret shopper visit × substitute available fish variety. We only present the
coefficient corresponding to the interaction term Tc × P ostt for each treatment. Controls for Tc , P ostt , covariates, and baseline
value of the dependent variable are included, but those coefficients are not shown. Robust standard errors are clustered by circuit
in parentheses.

7

Cost-Effectiveness of Enforcement vs. Information

Given the complications associated with enforcing regulations documented in this paper, and
the complexity of designing regulations that are robust to unanticipated defensive reactions
from enforced agents, it is useful to determine how cost-effective the enforcement strategies
were relative to an information campaign. We collected data from Sernapesca on the full
administrative costs of implementing each treatment, so that we can report on the relative
cost-effectiveness of enforcement and information strategies.
We define effectiveness of our interventions on the basis of our treatment effects on all hake
sales (visible, hidden or frozen). Since the fish sold in ferias comes directly from fishermen
villages and was harvested the same day or the day before, we assume that reduced hake sales
is proportional to the decrease in hake fishing. The fishermen survey results reported in section
6.3 suggests that fishermen did feel the effects of the interventions. Our interventions were
conducted at scale covering all major markets where hake is sold, which implies that our data
are net of “leakages” of hake from our sampling areas.
In Table 9, we conduct the relative cost-effectiveness analysis by taking our best estimates
of the effects of treatments on reduction in hake sales and combining it with an estimate of
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the number of fish available in the market that we compute using the data we collected from
vendors. This allows us to create an estimate of the extra hake fish that are “saved” due to
these treatments. Methodological details underlying these calculations are in Appendix F.
Table 9: Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

Enforcement (Overall)
Unpredictable
Predictable
Low Frequency
High Frequency
Info Campaign

(1)
Reduction
of Hake Sale

(2)
Units of Hake
Saved

0.13
0.192
0.06
0.162
0.07
0.13

10,399
15,358
4,799
12,959
5,599
3,257

(3)
(4)
Implementation
Cost of Saving
Costs (USD)
One Hake (USD)
$
$
$
$
$
$

62,900.25
69,190.27
62,900.25
53,475.84
99,613.61
16,213.53

$ 6.05
$ 4.51
$ 13.11
$ 4.13
$ 17.79
$ 4.98

Notes: This table shows the benefits and costs of implementing each intervention. Column (1) reports the estimated effects (in
percentage points) of treatments in the sale of any type of hake. Column (2) is computed based on the numbers of stall per feria,
number of days a week the feria operate and number of fish available in a normal stall. Column (3) is reported by Sernapesca and
represents a combination of fixed and variable costs. Finally, column (4) correspond to the ration of (3) over (2). These calculations
assume the control group had zero enforcement nor information campaign. As we discussed in section C.1.4, the control group
(mistakenly) received a few enforcement visits, the cost is negligible.

We compare this number with the cost of implementing each intervention to compute how
much it cost to save each fish under each of the treatment assignments. Overall, the information
campaign appears more cost effective than the enforcement strategy. This is partly because
enforcement becomes less effective as vendors learn to hide and freeze fish and circumvent
regulation. Enforcement costs US$6.05 per saved fish, compared to $4.98 under the information
campaign.
However, once we examine specific versions of the enforcement strategy that were more
successful at curbing hake sales, we see that sending monitors on an unpredictable schedule is
a more cost effective way to protect hake, even after accounting for the fact that unpredictable
monitoring schedules were more costly for Sernapesca to maintain because it required slack
personnel capacity. The cost of “saving” a hake via unpredictable enforcement drops to $4.51.
Not surprisingly, less frequent monitoring schedule is most cost-effective ($4.13 per saved hake)
because it was both more effective at reducing hake sale than high-frequency enforcement, and
it was obviously also cheaper to implement. Predictable and high-frequency audits were total
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policy failures in that they were 250-400% too expensive per hake saved, given the subversive
adaptation by hake vendors.
These calculations are useful to gauge the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative strategies
to protect hake, but it does not tell us whether any of these strategies would pass a cost-benefit
test. Sophisticated benefit calculation would require us to take a stance on the biology of
hake fish (how saving a hake in September 2015 translates into a dynamic effect on the hake
population via reproduction), and the ecological value of protecting hake. These considerations
are outside the scope of our analysis, but our results can be easily combined with benefit
numbers from ecology studies. The analysis in this paper takes the government’s regulatory goal
(“Protect hake fish through a September fishing ban”) as given, and studies the consequences
of enforcing that regulation, and analyzes the best ways to achieve that goal.

8

Conclusion

Research in many fields of applied microeconomics evaluate the effects of new regulations, such
as anti-corruption campaigns, fines for non-compliance with health, hygiene or environmental
standards, or penalties for tax evaders. The effectiveness of such policies depend on the (sometimes unanticipated) reactions of the regulated agents to the new enforcement regime, which
is in essence a micro version of the “Lucas critique” (Lucas, 1976). Agents adapt once they
have had a chance to learn about the new rules, and may discover new methods to circumvent the rules. This paper presents a research strategy - composed of an experimental design
and creative data collection - that permits an investigation of the effects of regulation net of
agent adaptive behaviors.31 This research approach should be broadly useful for policy evaluation whenever agents can adapt to circumvent enforcement. As one important example, such
concerns were first-order in the design of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act in 2010 following the global financial crisis. Smith and Muñiz-Fraticelli (2013)
31

An alternative evaluation strategy would be to collect data in the short run before agents have an opportunity to react to the new regime, and in the long-run after they have reacted. This is more expensive, requires
more time, and fundamentally more difficult, because researchers do not always know when and how agents
would learn and adapt.
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write about this regulatory effort:
“[A] major problem with the new financial legislation is that it is responsive
to past market innovations without being sensitive to future innovations (...) The
problem is that these actors will not always behave in a predictable way. That is
the genius of financial innovation; the market always looks for new opportunities
for profit, and, as the dawn follows the dark, mischief may arise.”
Our experimental variations that change the specific attributes of enforcement policy yield
novel empirical insights about the adaptive behavior of regulated agents, and how to better
design policy accounting for their adaptation. Data collected via mystery shoppers help us identify the ways in which agents exploit loopholes to continue selling fish illegally. Implementing a
high frequency monitoring schedule produces a counter-intuitive result – but one that economic
theory can rationalize – it allows vendors to learn the regulators’ strategies faster, and more
effectively cheat, thereby undermining enforcement efforts. Our theoretical and empirical results imply that even if monitoring is cheap, the regulator may do better by holding back some
enforcement resources. And when you do monitor, adopting an unpredictable schedule makes
it more difficult for agents to circumvent enforcement and proves to be the most cost-effective
way to reduce hake sales even though it is more expensive to implement.
We use multiple surveys of different market actors to document that these interventions
travel downstream to affect consumer behavior and travel upstream to affect the behavior
of fishermen who supply to vendors. Our investigation of vendor reactions through mystery
shoppers, spillover effects on other market actors, and benchmarking these results against the
effects of an information campaign, all combine to produce a comprehensive evaluation of an
important environmental program.
Ultimately we learn that without sophisticated design-thinking, attempts at enforcement
can backfire. Designing and implementing a consumer information campaign is a much less
complex task, it leverages consumer ethics (Hainmueller et al., 2015), and many regulators
may rationally choose to proceed with such simpler approaches. After observing the results of
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this evaluation, the Chilean government decided to scale-up the information campaign during
the 2016 ban on hake fish sales, and conduct similar information campaigns for fishing bans
for three other species.32 While the unpredictable, low-frequency monitoring proved to be
the single-most cost-effective strategy in our evaluation, the government correctly surmised
that vendors may have other second and third order subversive adaptations to audits in the
long run. In contrast to an enforcement strategy which may need to be constantly revised
in response to regulated agents’ adaptation, the information campaign is easier to replicate
and scale, especially once the government has already incurred the fixed costs of developing
campaign materials.
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A
A.1

Appendix Figures on the Research Context
Fishermen Villages
Figure A.1: Fishermen Village (Caleta)

A.2

Outdoor Markets
Figure A.2: Examples of Ferias
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Figure A.3: Example of a Circuit

Figure A.3 maps the four ferias that compound one circuit of the city of Los Angeles, VII
region.
Figure A.4: Map of Circuits and Caletas
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A.3

Interventions
Figure A.5: Flyers

The figure A.5 shows the two types of flyers distributed during the ban period. The message
of the one in the right says, “In September respect the Ban”, the one in the right says “This
month respect the Ban”.
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Figure A.6: Letter to Consumers

The figure A.6 shows the letter distributed to households during September 2015. The
letter, signed by Sernapesca’s director, informs about the September ban and the fact that
hake’s conservation is threatened because of overfishing.
Figure A.7: Examples of Neighborhood Treatment Assignment
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The 48 most populated comunas were divided randomly into three levels of saturation:
high, low and zero. Based on the level of saturation, the information campaign was assigned
at the neighborhood level. The figure A.7 shows the map of three different comunas: The
comuna in the left didn’t receive information campaign, the one in the center received low level
of saturation, the one in the right received high level of saturation. In red, those neighborhoods
assigned to receive the information campaign.
Figure A.8 describes our interventions and data collection activities along the supply chain
for fish. We collected data through surveys and mystery shoppers visits on seven occasions
between August 2015 and August 2016.

Interventions

Data Sources

Figure A.8: Interventions and Data Collection at different Points along the Fish Supply Chain

B
B.1

- Fishermen Survey
(July-Aug 2016)

Fishermen

- Mystery Shoppers Visits - Baseline Consumer Survey
(Sept 2015)
(Aug 2015)
- Mystery Shoppers Visits - Follow-up Consumer Survey
(March 2016)
(Oct 2015)
- Vendor Survey
- Follow-up Consumer Survey
(June 2016)
(March 2016)

Fish Vendors

Fish Consumers

Enforcement Visits
(Sept 2015)

Information Campaign
(Sept 2015)

Appendix Figures on Results
Adoption of Defensive Actions

Figure B.1 describes the unconditional probability of selling hake defensively (either frozen or
hidden) by week. The probability of selling defensively increases over time, while the overall
probability of selling hake decreases substantially along the month. The conditional probability
is presented in B.1.
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Figure B.1: Adoption of Defensive Actions
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Figure B.1 describes the unconditional probability of selling hake either frozen or hidden. The coefficients were obtained from an
OLS regression in which the treatment assignment interacts with weekly dummies. We include strata fixed effects and cluster at
the circuit level. The "No Enforcement" category is the omitted category and includes observations assigned to the control group
and the information campaign. To facilitate the interpretation, we only present the confidence intervals associated with weeks one
and four.

B.2

Number of Stalls

Figure B.2 describes the average number of fish stalls in the first and second half of the month.
It shows that the average number of fish stalls does decrease in the markets randomly assigned
to the enforcement treatment, especially during the second half of September.
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Figure B.2: Number of stalls in Feria by Treatment Assignment

This figure shows the average number of stalls in each feria, separately for the first and the second half of the month. Markets
assigned to receive enforcement showed a decrease in the number of stalls between the first and the second half of the month.

B.3

Prices

Figure B.3 describes the week-by-week evolution of (log) prices for hake and pomfret during
the ban. Both rates are normalized to their levels in the first week. It shows that the price of
hake increased week-to-week, throughout the ban period; the hake price in the fourth week is
40% higher than the first price. Pomfret prices fell by 10% in the second week, and that lower
prices remained stable after that.
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Figure B.3: Log Prices of Fish During the Ban
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This figure shows the evolution of log prices for hake and pomfret, using the first week as a reference. The price of hake continuously
increased over the course of September 2015. Hake was 40% more expensive by the fourth week relative to the first week. The
price of pomfret decreased around 10% after the first week.

C
C.1
C.1.1

Appendix Tables
Descriptive Statistics
Data Collected by Mystery Shoppers

During September 2015, the mystery shoppers interacted with fish-vendors 908 times. The
table C.1 describes observable characteristics of the stalls visited and the vendors. In general,
each stall was operated by one person. Mostly man, and based on mystery shoppers’ guess,
47-year-old. The type of weight used informs about the formality of the stall; digital weights
are more precise and expensive.
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Table C.1: Fish Vendors in Ferias
Variable

Mean

SD

Min Max

N

Number of Vendors per Stall

1.089

0.326

1

4

883

Proportion Female Fish Vendor

0.425

0.479

0

1

882

Age Vendor

47.438

10.126

19

75

876

Prices Visibly Listed

0.242

0.429

0

1

908

No Weight

0.262

0.440

0

1

848

Mechanical Weight

0.410

0.492

0

1

848

Digital Weight

0.308

0.462

0

1

848

Type of Weight

Notes: This table presents observable characteristics of fish stalls visited by mystery shoppers during September 2015. The variable
“Age Vendor” was not directly asked but guessed by mystery shoppers. The type of weight used to weight fish is a proxy of the
level of formality of the fish stall.

The table C.2 describes the availability of different types of fish in feria stalls during the
ban period. During a typical month, hake would be available in roughly 90% of stalls, however,
due to the ban period (and our interventions), only 26% of stalls had hake for sale. The fish
species offered in markets depend largely on the latitude of the market, i.e., markets located
in the southern regions offer slightly different fish species than the stalls located in northern
regions.
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Table C.2: Fish Availability in Feria Stalls
Fish

Availability

Price/unit (USD) Price/kg (USD) Unitary Weight (kg)

N

Hake

0.263

1.08

3.81

0.284

239

Pomfret

0.684

5.27

4.99

1.057

621

Mackerel

0.124

2.05

4.16

0.492

113

Silverside

0.096

0.17

2.92

0.059

87

Salmon

0.139

7.53

9.22

0.816

126

Sawfish

0.057

6.27

6.25

1.003

52

Albacore

0.051

.

9.21

.

46

Southern Hake

0.042

7.30

5.59

1.306

38

Notes: This table presents the availability and average prices of different fish types in feria stalls during September 2015. The
mystery shoppers recorded the price for each fish offered for sale in each fish-stall visited. The sale price in each stall was based on
units, kilos or both. The unitary weight is estimated using the ratio of these two prices. The albacore is a considerably larger fish
type (over 20 kgs) and is only sold in pieces (by kg).

C.1.2

Data Collected in the Fisherman Survey

A round of surveys to Fishermen was collected in August 2016. In total, 231 fishermen were
surveyed and asked about their work, typical buyers and fishing behavior. The table C.3
describes the main variables collected in the survey.
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Table C.3: Fishermen Characteristics
Variable

Mean

SD

Min

Max

N

Boat Length (mts)

8.52

3.11

6

24

227

Boat Powered by a Motor

0.88

0.33

0

1

231

Fiberglass Boat

0.57

0.50

0

1

228

Wooden Boat

0.39

0.49

0

1

228

Number of Unions in the Caleta

1.67

0.90

0

3

230

Fisherman Member of a Union

0.82

0.38

0

1

230

Summer

5.01

1.47

1

7

226

Winter

2.25

1.14

0

7

227

Less than 10

0.24

0.43

0

1

189

Between 10 and 30

0.22

0.41

0

1

189

Between 31 and 60

0.24

0.43

0

1

189

Between 61 and 100

0.12

0.32

0

1

189

More than 100

0.19

0.39

0

1

189

Hake

0.56

0.50

0

1

230

Sawfish

0.24

0.43

0

1

230

Cuttlefish

0.24

0.43

0

1

230

Pomfret

0.13

0.34

0

1

230

Bass

0.10

0.30

0

1

230

Final Consumer

0.58

0.49

0

1

230

Feria Vendor

0.27

0.45

0

1

228

Intermediary

0.60

0.49

0

1

227

Fisherman Boat characteristics:

Union Participation:

Number of Days that Goes Fishing Every Week:

Number of Boats in the Caleta:

Top 3 Most Captured Fishes in the Caleta:

Usual Buyer of the Fish at the Dock:

Notes: This table describes the responses to the Fishermen Survey carried out in August 2016 to 231 fishermen. On average, three
fishermen were surveyed in each of the 74 caletas that operate in the four coastal regions included in our sample. The last section
of the table represents the proportion that responded that Always or Most of the Time the fish was sold to these type of buyers.
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C.1.3

Consumer Mobility Between Neighborhoods

The table C.4 shows the proportion of consumers treated by the information campaign depending on the location of the feria where they are surveyed. The striking fact in this table is
that in high-saturation municipalities, the proportion of consumers treated with the information campaign is high, regardless of whether we found that person shopping in a feria located
in a treatment neighborhood (78%) or in a control neighborhood (69%). High Information
campaign saturation is therefore the effective treatment variable, and conditional on that, the
specific location of the feria does not matter too much.
Table C.4: Proportion of Consumers located in Treated Neighborhoods
Survey in Feria located Survey in Feria located
in Treated Neigh

in Control Neigh

Prop

N

Prop

N

High Saturation Municipality

0.78

1114

0.69

389

Low Saturation Municipality

0.57

559

0.17

825

Zero Saturation Municipality

0

0

0.00

1014

0.71

1673

0.18

2228

Overall

Notes: This table shows the proportion of consumers whose households are located in neighborhoods assigned to receive the
information campaign. These statistics are based on households’ location reported by surveyed consumers. 71% of consumers
surveyed in a feria located in a treated neighborhood live in a household located in a treated neighborhood; the remaining 29%
are consumers who live in a household located in a control neighborhood. This table informs about the high consumers’ mobility
between neighborhoods. In fact, in high-saturation municipalities, the proportion of treated consumers is higher in both, ferias
located in treatment and control neighborhoods.

C.1.4

Enforcement Implementation

This section describes the implementation of enforcement activities by Sernapesca officials. The
research team planned the schedule of visits to different circuits. The execution was carried out
by Sernapesca inspectors, as part of their usual tasks. The information about the actual visits
was collected from the reports written by inspectors on a daily basis.33 In total, 230 visits were
carried out, equivalent to 659 stall-inspections in 62 circuits. Based on the inspectors’ reports,
33

These reports contain information on the identity of the inspectors, the ferias visited that day, the number
of fish stalls inspected, and whether illegal fish were detected. Importantly, the inspectors’ performance does
not depend on the information collected by these reports, but they rather work as a logbook of their activities.
The research team periodically accessed, systematized and digitized this information.
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illegal hake was detected in 11% of inspected stalls. This number is three times smaller than
what our secret shoppers observed in markets.
Table C.5 describes the implementation of enforcement visits relative to the treatment
assignment. The average number of visits in different treatment arms is slightly smaller than
the original plan, this gap is explained by “contingencies” that obstructed the expected routine,
and possibly, some under-reporting on behalf of inspectors. Also, a few visits were noted in
Control group markets; these were generally markets located near Sernapesca regional offices,
that officials unpromptedly visited.
Table C.5: Implementation of the Interventions
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

At Least One Visit
Treatment Assignment

Number

Number of Different

Circuit Visited

Number

Number of Different

of Visits

Days of the Week Visited

at Least Once

of Visits

Days of the Week Visited

N

No Enforcement

0.39

0.30

0.22

1.80

1.40

23

Enforcement

2.53

1.49

0.69

3.68

2.18

83

Low Freq. and Unpredictable Sch.

1.48

1.14

0.62

2.39

1.83

29

High Freq. and Unpredictable Sch.

5.00

2.80

0.87

5.77

3.23

15

Low Freq. and Predictable Sch.

1.30

0.85

0.65

2.00

1.31

20

High Freq. and Predictable Sch.

3.47

1.68

0.68

5.08

2.46

19

This table reports the unconditional mean of visits to circuits in different treatment arms. Column 4 presents the average number
of visits conditional on receiving at least one visit. The difference between the number of visits in circuits assigned to High-Intensity
Enforcement relative to Low Intensity is statistically significant at 1%.

The experimental design varied two margins of enforcement deployment; the frequency, and
the predictability of the visits. The implementation of frequency variations can be evaluated
based on the number of visits to each circuit. The predictability variation can be assessed based
on the number of different days of the week in which visits were carried out. If predictable
enforcement was implemented correctly, it should repeat the days of visits every week, so we
should expect fewer days of the week visited. On average, circuits assigned to enforcement
received 2.53 visits in 1.49 different days of the week. Both treatment variations generate
significant differences in the relevant margins: High-frequency circuits received substantially
more visits than low-frequency circuits. Unpredictable circuits were visited in more days of the
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week than predictable enforcement. The columns 4 and 5 compare these margins conditioning
on receiving at least one visit.

C.2

Balance

We did not conduct a full baseline survey, but had access to municipality administrative data
and weather data with which we could check balance across treatment arms. The table C.6
shows balance tests across the main treatment arms. Tables C.7 and C.8 also show balance
tests with respect to the enforcement predictability and frequency sub-treatments.
Overall, the various treatment arms appear well balanced in terms of important socioeconomic and weather characteristics (e.g. poverty rate, rainfall). The joint test F-statistics of
all variables are insignificant for different treatment arms. The delinquency rate (i.e., per-capita
police cases for major offenses) is lower in municipalities assigned to receive the information
campaign relative to the control group. The regressions reported below control for this variable,
but we have verified that the reported treatment effects are not sensitive to adding this control.

C.2.1

Balance Tables

The table C.6 presents the balance of relevant characteristics across different treatment arms.
These variables include market’s observable characteristics, socioeconomic characteristics of the
municipality and weather information of the day of the visit by a mystery shopper. The columns
1, 2, 4 and 6 present the mean and SD of these variables for different treatment arms. The
columns 3, 5 and 7 compare the difference relative to the control group as well as its p-value.
Finally, joint significance tests are also reported in the last two columns. The tables C.7 and
C.8 present the same estimates but decomposing by the enforcement variations: predictability
and frequency.
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Table C.6: Randomization Balance on Observables
(1)
Variable

Indicator Fixed Stalls

Distance to Closest Caleta (kms)

Poverty Rate Municipality

Av. Monthly Income Municipality (USD)

Deliquency Rate Municipality

Rain Indicator

Average Temperature (Celsius)

Control

(2)

(3)

Info Campaign

(4)

(5)

Enforcement

(6)

(7)

Enforc. and Info Camp.

Mean

Mean

Diff

Mean

Diff

Mean

Diff

0.573

0.644

0.083

0.489

-0.069

0.509

0.013

( 0.497)

( 0.484)

[ 0.740]

( 0.501)

[ 0.574]

( 0.501)

[ 0.920]

16.507

11.572

3.465

14.863

-3.606

26.425

2.245

( 25.082)

( 9.503)

[ 0.516]

( 22.626)

[ 0.386]

( 29.037)

[ 0.682]

19.006

17.567

-2.148

18.026

-1.079

16.734

-0.316

( 4.780)

( 3.313)

[ 0.244]

( 5.483)

[ 0.412]

( 7.549)

[ 0.851]

791.767

875.475

18.446

790.514

-2.506

830.683

20.464

( 149.808)

( 172.858)

[ 0.846]

( 140.334)

[ 0.953]

( 139.251)

[ 0.673]

0.038

0.029

-0.013

0.036

-0.001

0.034

-0.004

( 0.015)

( 0.002)

[ 0.016]

( 0.015)

[ 0.835]

( 0.009)

[ 0.480]

0.290

0.133

-0.124

0.178

-0.114

0.142

-0.122

( 0.456)

( 0.344)

[ 0.455]

( 0.383)

[ 0.318]

( 0.349)

[ 0.301]

12.200

12.126

0.081

11.993

-0.192

11.936

-0.688

( 2.281)

( 2.087)

[ 0.942]

( 2.021)

[ 0.797]

( 2.196)

[ 0.346]

Joint Significance
F statistic

0.609

1.094

0.816

p-value

0.747

0.371

0.575

Notes: This table reports characteristics of circuits included in our sample across treatment arms. The columns (1), (2), (4) and
(6) show the mean and the standard deviation for the control and treatment groups. The columns (3), (5) and (7) show the
coefficient on treatments from regressions of each characteristic on treatments and strata fixed effects, clustering standard errors
at the circuit level. The p-values are reported in brackets. The socio-economic characteristics are aggregated at Municipality level.
These variables should be interpreted as the characteristics of the Municipality where the circuit is located. Also, this table reports
weather information of the day that different circuits were visited by mystery shoppers. Finally, joint significance test statistics: F
statistic and p-values, for all variables on each treatment arm are reported in the last two rows of the table.
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Table C.7: Randomization Balance: Enforcement Predictability
(1)
Variable

Control
Mean

Indicator Fixed Stalls

Distance to Closest Caleta (kms)

Poverty Rate Municipality

Av. Monthly Income Municipality (USD)

(2)

Info Campaign
Mean

Rain Indicator

Average Temperature (Celsius)

Diff

(4)

(5)

Enforc: Predictable Schedule
Mean

Diff

(6)

(7)

Enforc: Unpredictable Schedule
Mean

Diff

0.573

0.644

0.080

0.396

-0.148

0.575

0.045

( 0.497)

( 0.484)

[ 0.749]

( 0.490)

[ 0.270]

( 0.495)

[ 0.710]

16.507

11.572

3.822

17.286

1.704

20.487

-4.926

( 25.082)

( 9.503)

[ 0.479]

( 23.417)

[ 0.678]

( 27.384)

[ 0.333]

19.006

17.567

-2.173

17.130

-1.739

17.890

-0.075

( 4.780)

( 3.313)

[ 0.240]

( 6.185)

[ 0.212]

( 6.450)

[ 0.960]

791.767

875.475

( 149.808) ( 172.858)
Deliquency Rate Municipality

(3)

18.828

809.457

-1.068

801.805

9.235

[ 0.843]

( 153.747)

[ 0.981]

( 130.506)

[ 0.834]

0.038

0.029

-0.013

0.036

-0.002

0.035

-0.001

( 0.015)

( 0.002)

[ 0.015]

( 0.015)

[ 0.648]

( 0.012)

[ 0.782]

0.290

0.133

-0.126

0.117

-0.158

0.202

-0.080

( 0.456)

( 0.344)

[ 0.446]

( 0.322)

[ 0.162]

( 0.402)

[ 0.488]

12.200

12.126

0.076

12.058

-0.170

11.904

-0.491

( 2.281)

( 2.087)

[ 0.946]

( 2.057)

[ 0.824]

( 2.107)

[ 0.498]

Joint Significance
F statistic

0.609

1.954

1.717

p-value

0.747

0.067

0.111

Notes: This table reports characteristics of circuits included in our sample across treatment arms. The columns (1), (2), (4) and
(6) show the mean and the standard deviation for the control and treatment groups. The columns (3), (5) and (7) show the
coefficient on treatments from regressions of each characteristic on treatments and strata fixed effects, clustering standard errors
at the circuit level. The p-values are reported in brackets. The socio-economic characteristics are aggregated at Municipality level.
These variables should be interpreted as the characteristics of the Municipality where the circuit is located. Also, this table reports
weather information of the day that different circuits were visited by mystery shoppers. Finally, joint significance test statistics: F
statistic and p-values, for all variables on each treatment arm are reported in the last two rows of the table.
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Table C.8: Randomization Balance: Enforcement Frequency
(1)
Variable

Indicator Fixed Stalls

Distance to Closest Caleta (kms)

Poverty Rate Municipality

Av. Monthly Income Municipality (USD)

Control

(2)

(3)

Info Campaign

(4)

Rain Indicator

Average Temperature (Celsius)

(6)

(7)

Enforc: High Frequency Enforc: Low Frequency

Mean

Mean

Diff

Mean

Diff

Mean

Diff

0.573

0.644

0.098

0.372

-0.164

0.591

0.039

( 0.497)

( 0.484)

[ 0.696]

( 0.484)

[ 0.211]

( 0.492)

[ 0.753]

16.507

11.572

4.009

16.224

-5.302

21.269

0.600

( 25.082)

( 9.503)

[ 0.451]

( 23.309)

[ 0.330]

( 27.292)

[ 0.885]

19.006

17.567

-1.975

16.242

-2.256

18.564

0.140

( 4.780)

( 3.313)

[ 0.279]

( 7.011)

[ 0.101]

( 5.576)

[ 0.922]

791.767

875.475

17.128

821.315

23.237

792.779

-8.734

[ 0.587]

( 138.930)

[ 0.840]

( 149.808) ( 172.858) [ 0.857] ( 142.660)
Deliquency Rate Municipality

(5)

0.038

0.029

-0.013

0.036

-0.000

0.035

-0.003

( 0.015)

( 0.002)

[ 0.014]

( 0.013)

[ 0.973]

( 0.014)

[ 0.547]

0.290

0.133

-0.128

0.193

-0.077

0.143

-0.143

( 0.456)

( 0.344)

[ 0.439]

( 0.396)

[ 0.491]

( 0.350)

[ 0.215]

12.200

12.126

0.050

12.127

-0.192

11.853

-0.447

( 2.281)

( 2.087)

[ 0.964]

( 2.204)

[ 0.799]

( 1.984)

[ 0.545]

Joint Significance
F statistic

0.609

2.016

2.090

p-value

0.747

0.058

0.049

Notes: This table reports characteristics of circuits included in our sample across treatment arms. The columns (1), (2), (4) and
(6) show the mean and the standard deviation for the control and treatment groups. The columns (3), (5) and (7) show the
coefficient on treatments from regressions of each characteristic on treatments and strata fixed effects, clustering standard errors
at the circuit level. The p-values are reported in brackets. The socio-economic characteristics are aggregated at Municipality level.
These variables should be interpreted as the characteristics of the Municipality where the circuit is located. Also, this table reports
weather information of the day that different circuits were visited by mystery shoppers. Finally, joint significance test statistics: F
statistic and p-values, for all variables on each treatment arm are reported in the last two rows of the table.

Table C.9 shows the coefficients of regression 2. The first three rows show the differences
in the sale of illegal hake in the pre-intervention period. The interaction of “× Post” capture
the effect that result from the interventions. The first three rows indicate that there were
no statistically significant differences between treatment and control groups during the preintervention period. As expected, significant differences between markets appear after the
interventions are launched (after the first week of September).
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Table C.9: Treatment Effects on Hake Sales

VARIABLES

(1)
Fresh,
Visible Hake

(2)
Any Hake Available
(Hidden, Frozen, Visible)

0.080
(0.056)
0.114
(0.070)
0.078
(0.070)
-0.133
(0.066)
-0.178
(0.082)
-0.179
(0.074)

0.029
(0.058)
0.092
(0.060)
0.100
(0.065)
-0.131
(0.074)
-0.130
(0.089)
-0.139
(0.094)

-0.21
901

-0.36
901

Information Campaign Only
Enforcement Only
Information Campaign and Enforcement
Information Campaign Only × Post
Enforcement Only × Post
Info Campaign and Enforcement × Post

Change in Dep. Var. in Control Group
During Intervention Period
N

Notes: This table reports the effect of each treatment arm on the availability of illegal hake fish. The variable Fresh Hake indicates
when the hake was available fresh. Hake available indicates when was possible to buy fish in any form. The table reports marginal
effects from a Probit regression. Other controls are included: municipality characteristics, strata fixed effects and the average level
of the outcome variable in pre-intervention period. We control for pre-treatment values for the outcome variables in addition to the
treatment indicator, because not all markets were visited in pre-intervention period. Robust standard errors clustered by circuit
(the unit of randomization) in parentheses.

C.3

Adaptation to the Schedule of Visits

Our model suggests that vendors would learn and adapt to the pattern of visits. We use the
daily data over the course of the September ban to study how the vendors adjust to the visit
patterns they observe.
Table C.10 shows how selling decisions differ in the second half of the month, depending on
how concentrated the earlier inspections were in specific ferias and on specific days of the week
(DOWs). We control for the total number of visits in studying the effects of “targeting” only
one feria or day-of-week. We find that auditing different ferias on different DOW reduces hake
sales by an extra 9 percentage points (p-val<0.01) in the second half of the month, relative to
targeting all visits at the same feria.
Table C.11 studies vendors’ decisions to sell hake in the non-targeted feria in the second half
of the month. This is a circuit-fixed effects regression, so the coefficient “DOW not visited ×
2nd half” shows the same vendor’s decision to sell on a weekday in which he did not experience
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Table C.10: Hake Available based on the Number of different ferias and Days of the Week
visited

(1)
(2)
(3)
Any Hake Available

VARIABLES
N Ferias Visited

0.041
(0.030)
-0.091
(0.023)

N Ferias Visited × Second Half
N DOWs Visited
N DOWs Visited × Second Half

Change Dep Var First - Second Half
N

-0.31
906

0.030
(0.055)
-0.098
(0.073)

0.039
(0.033)
-0.081
(0.035)
0.014
(0.056)
-0.037
(0.077)

-0.31
906

-0.31
906

Notes: This table studies how the probability of selling hake depends on the number of different days of the week (DOWs) and the
number of different ferias that a circuit got visited during the ban. The observations are divided between the first and second half
of the month to retain enough statistical power; other pre-post decompositions produce similar results. The table presents OLS
coefficients of the relevant variables. Since DOWs and N Ferias are positively correlated, the columns 1 and 2 run them separately.
Column 3 includes both variables and interactions. Each regression controls for “Second Half”, the total number of visits, and
the interaction of the two variables. Also, they control for the dependent variable in the pre-intervention period, and strata fixed
effects and municipality characteristics. Also, each regression controls for treatment assignment. Robust standard errors clustered
by circuit in parentheses.

a visit relative to another weekday when he did. We see that the hake selling in the second
half of the month was higher in ferias and DOWs that did not receive enforcement relative to
the ones that did.
We consider this evidence as only suggestive and placed it in the appendix, because Sernapesca chose which feria to visit within each circuit partly based on logistical considerations,
and this cannot be treated as random. Indeed, the un-interacted terms in the regression show
some differences (in the opposite direction!) across ferias within the circuit in the first part of
the month.
Table C.12 shows that this same effect is not only seen in the propensity to sell, but also in
the number of stalls that vendors choose to continue to operate in the second half of the month.
The interacted coefficients “...× second half” show that more stalls disappear entirely in the
second half of the month in the targeted ferias operating on targeted DOWs, relative to the
non-targeted. The effect is larger when the vendors operate in more than two ferias, because
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Table C.11: Hake Sale across DOWs and Ferias within Circuit
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
Any Hake Available
Circuits that
Rotate between
Full Sample
More Than 2 Ferias

VARIABLES
Feria Not Visited
Feria Not Visited × Second Half

-0.209
(0.157)
0.058
(0.086)

DOW Not Visited

-0.252
(0.131)
0.192
(0.104)

DOW Not Visited × Second Half

Change Dep Var First - Second Half
N

-0.299
(0.182)
0.267
(0.130)

-0.31
906

-0.31
906

-0.303
(0.161)
0.286
(0.139)
-0.39
218

-0.39
218

Notes: This table examines whether the behavior of the vendors varied across days of the week or ferias. It shows the OLS coefficient
of dummy variables indicating whether the observation was collected in a feria or day that was not visited by Sernapesca officials
during the ban. The observations are divided between the first and second half of the month to retain enough statistical power.
Other pre-post decompositions produce similar results. These regressions include circuit fixed effects, so the coefficients capture
within circuit variation. The columns (3) and (4) restrict the analysis only to circuits that rotate between more than two ferias. It
controls for “Second Half” and weather covariates. Robust standard errors clustered by circuit in parentheses.

Table C.12: Number of Stalls Hake Sale across DOWs and Ferias within Circuit
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
Number of Stalls
Circuits that
Rotate between
Full Sample
More Than 2 Ferias

VARIABLES
Feria Not Visited
Feria Not Visited × Second Half

-0.510
(0.320)
0.354
(0.464)

DOW Not Visited

-0.024
(0.220)
0.317
(0.330)

DOW Not Visited × Second Half

Change Dep Var First - Second Half
N

-0.956
(0.368)
1.331
(0.771)

0.03
374

0.03
374

-0.241
(0.312)
0.995
(0.450)
0.20
104

0.20
104

Notes: This table examines whether the number of stalls selling fish varied across days of the week or ferias. It shows the OLS
coefficient of dummy variables indicating whether the observation was collected in a feria or day that was not visited by Sernapesca
officials during the ban. Every observation correspond to a feria and are divided between the first and second half of the month
to retain enough statistical power. Other pre-post decompositions produce similar results. These regressions include circuit fixed
effects, so the coefficients capture within circuit variation. The columns (3) and (4) restrict the analysis only to circuits that rotate
between more than two ferias. It controls for “Second Half” and weather covariates. Robust standard errors clustered by circuit in
parentheses.
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those are the circuits where vendors have more options to adjust and displace sales across days
of week.
The preceding tables explain why predictable enforcement is less effective. As our theoretical
model lays out clearly, Vendors learn from the pattern of targeted ferias and targeted days of
week, and adjust to sell more on non-targeted days.

C.4

Exit of Stalls Correction

Our main results are based on the information gathered by mystery shoppers from the operative
stalls at the moment of the visit, which does not capture the fact that the “missing” stalls are not
selling hake. To correct for this issue we identify the average number of stalls per circuit/visit
before and after the interventions. The comparison between these two averages informs about
the number of “missing” stalls per circuit.34 The number of stalls observed by mystery shoppers
in every visit in the post treatment period is increased by computed number of missing stalls.
The added observations have zero fish available.35

34

36

We allow the number of missing stalls to be non-integer, and negative if the number of stalls increased.
If the number “missing” stalls is negative: the number of stalls observed by mystery shoppers in every visit
in the pre-treatment period is increased by that number.
36
Since we allow the number “missing” stalls to be non-integer, we add a random noise that distributes
uniform between -0.5 and 0.5, and then, the sum of the “missing” number and the noise is rounded to the
closest integer. This correction makes the expansion more representative of the right (possibly non-integer)
number.
35
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Table C.13: Treatment Effect on Hake Availability Correcting for the Exit of Stalls

VARIABLES
Panel A: Main Specification
Info Campaign Only

(1)
Fresh,
Visible Hake

-0.118
(0.060)
Enforcement Only
-0.190
(0.082)
Info Campaign and Enforcement
-0.156
(0.084)
Panel B: Variation in Predictability of Enforcement
Info Campaign Only
-0.111
(0.062)
Enforcement on Predictable Schedule
-0.091
(0.073)
Enforcement on Unpredictable Schedule
-0.246
(0.089)
Panel C: Variation in Frequency of Enforcement
Info Campaign Only
-0.113
(0.062)
High Frequency Enforcement
-0.086
(0.092)
Low Frequency Enforcement
-0.184
(0.086)
Change in Dep Var in Control
During Intervention
Covariates
Baseline Control
N

-0.17
Yes
Yes
1014

(2)
Any Hake Available
(Fresh-Visible, Hidden or Frozen)
-0.115
(0.065)
-0.141
(0.091)
-0.130
(0.104)
-0.121
(0.064)
-0.061
(0.087)
-0.197
(0.100)
-0.121
(0.064)
-0.092
(0.101)
-0.148
(0.095)

-0.28
Yes
Yes
1014

Notes: This table presents the coefficient corresponding to the interaction term Tc × P ostt for each treatment correcting for the
exit of stalls. The increase in the number of observations relative to results presented earlier is due to the fact that the correction is
done by adding the “missing” stalls (calculated compraing the number of stalls per circuit before and after the interventions). The
panel A describes the same specification presented in Table 2. Panels B and C follow the same specification than Table 4. Probit
regression marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors clustered by circuit in parentheses.

C.5

Treatment Effects Six Months After the Ban Period

Table C.14 describe the answers to the consumer survey carried out in March 2016. The survey
had the same format as previous surveys; it asked about general consumption behavior based
on a list of items, including hake. Even though the survey was carried out in an off-ban period,
consumers assigned to the information campaign tend to report less hake consumption.
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Table C.14: Hake Purchases Reported by Consumers in March 2016 (Outside Ban Period)

VARIABLES
Information Campaign Only
Enforcement Only
Info Campaign and Enforcement

Mean Dep Var Control
N

(1)
Purchased Hake
last month

(2)
(3)
Number Times Usually Purchase
Hake Purchased
Hake

-0.133
(0.106)
0.018
(0.078)
-0.017
(0.081)

-0.419
(0.234)
-0.106
(0.205)
-0.197
(0.246)

-0.121
(0.100)
0.093
(0.069)
0.017
(0.077)

0.59
3652

1.19
3630

0.58
3652

Notes: This table presents the effect of different treatment arms on the reported consumption of hake fish by consumers based on
the round of surveys collected in March 2016. Columns 1 and 3 show marginal effects from Probit regressions. Column 2 shows the
marginal effects from a Poisson regression because the dependent variable is a count data. These regressions control for propensity
to purchase other types of fishes and other covariates. Standard errors are clustered based on the circuit where the survey was
collected.

C.6

Alternative Definition Information Campaign Treatment

Tables C.15 and C.16 present the main results using a different definition of the Information
Campaign treatment: The variable “Information campaign” indicates whether the observations
were collected by mystery shoppers in ferias located in treated neighborhoods - regardless of
the level of saturation of the municipality. This definition does not include possible information
spill-overs between neighborhoods within municipalities assigned to receive information.
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Table C.15: Treatment Effect on Hake Availability

VARIABLES
Information Campaign Only
Enforcement Only
Info Campaign and Enforcement

Change in Dep Var in Control
Markets During Intervention
N

(1)
Fresh,
Visible Hake

(2)
Any Hake Available
(Fresh-Visible, Hidden or Frozen)

-0.082
( 0.064)
-0.157
( 0.079)
-0.169
( 0.079)

-0.070
( 0.071)
-0.101
( 0.094)
-0.121
( 0.094)

-0.21
901

-0.36
901

Notes: This table reports the effect of each treatment arm on the availability of illegal hake fish. The variable “Info Campaign”
indicates if the feria where the data was collected is located in a neighborhood assigned to receive the information campaign.
Probit Marginal effects of he interactions Tc × P ostt are reported. Robust standard errors are clustered by circuit and presented
in parentheses.

Table C.16: Treatment Effect on Hake Sales by Enforcement Strategy
(1)
(2)
VARIABLES
Any Hake Available
Info Campaign Only
-0.073
-0.073
( 0.071) ( 0.071)
Enforcement on Predictable Schedule
-0.036
( 0.089)
Enforcement on Unpredictable Schedule -0.169
( 0.099)
High Freq. Enforcement
-0.049
( 0.101)
Low Freq Enforcement
-0.140
( 0.095)
Change in Dep Var in control Markets
During Intervention
N

-0.36
901

-0.36
901

Notes: This table reports the effect of each treatment arm on the availability of illegal hake fish. The first column includes compares
the effectiveness of predictable vs unpredictable enforcement. The second column divides enforcement depending on its intensity.
Each regression controls for the dependent variable in pre-intervention period, strata fixed effects and municipality characteristics.
The variable “Info Campaign” indicates if the feria where the data was collected is located in a neighborhood assigned to receive
the information campaign. Probit Marginal effects of he interactions Tc × P ostt are reported. Robust standard errors are clustered
by circuit and presented in parentheses.
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D

Appendix: Theoretical Model

D.1

Belief Formation with More than One Feria

We denote by zt = yt2 + 2yt1 + 1 the multinomial random variable of the profile of inspections in
period t, which we assumes is the underlying distribution determining the probability if a visit
4

in each feria.37 We assume that zt has a stationary distribution characterized by p = (pj )j=1 ,
where pj = P(zt = j). In this case we denote the prior by p̂0 ∼ Dirichlet ((βi )4i=1 ). Finally, we
denote by θ = (θ1 , θ2 ) the real probability of visits, which we call the visit policy.38 Note that
θ1 = p2 + p4 and θ2 = p3 + p4 .
The following result extends the vendor’s belief dynamics for this case.
Lemma 1 The vendor’s belief about the probability of a visit at feria i at time t satisfies
θˆt1 ∼ Beta α2 + α4 + Yt1 ; α1 + α3 + t − 1 − Yt1



θˆt2 ∼ Beta α3 + α4 + Yt2 ; α1 + α2 + t − 1 − Yt2







This result shows that the vendor updates her beliefs about the probability of a visit in
each feria by looking only at the history of visits at that feria.

D.2

Proofs

[Proof of Proposition 1] First we analyze the vendor’s the different options. To avoid unnecessary notation we omit the subindex t and write g = g(Yt ).
• She sells and does not defend if and only if U [h = 0|s = 1, Y ] ≥ 0 and U [h = 0|s =
1, Y ] ≥ U [h = 1|s = 1, Y ]. These restrictions together imply that
(

1
c
E[θ̂] ≤ min v;
Ω
g
37

)

.

Note that zt takes value one if no feria was inspected at time t, value 2 if only feria 1 was inspected, value
3 if only feria 2 was inspected, and value 4 if both ferias were inspected in that period.
38
As the distribution of zt is stationary, the probabilities of visits in both ferias also are.
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• She sells and defends if and only if U [h = 1|s = 1, Y ] ≥ 0 and U [hi = 1|si = 1, Y ] >
U [hi = 0|si = 1, Y ]. These restrictions together imply that (recall that δ =
δ=

c
,
Ωg

and

v−c
)
Ω(1−g)

δ < E[θ̂] ≤ δ .
• The vendor does not sell if and only if maxh∈{0,1} U [h|s = 1, Y ] < 0. These restrictions
together imply that
(

1
v−c
E[θ̂] > max v;
Ω
1−g
First, note that the conditions δ < δ, v > gc , and v <

v−c
1−g

)

.

are equivalent. Therefore, there is

a set of beliefs for which the vendor’s optimal choice is to sell and defend the hake if and only
if v > gc .
n

If v ≤ gc , then δ ≥ δ and the vendor never sells and defends. Moreover, as min v;
in this case she sells and does not defend if E[θ̂] ≤
Finally, if v ≤

c
g

v
Ω

c
g

o

=v

and does not sell otherwise.

the characterization follows directly form the comparison of the three

options.
[Long-run Comparative Statics] Define δ ∞ =

c
Ωḡ

and δ ∞ =

v−c
.
Ω(1−g)

First, note that Assump-

tion ḡ > c/v implies that δ ∞ < δ ∞ . As (a.s.) δ t → δ ∞ and δ t → δ ∞ , we have that in the long
run there is a set of beliefs for which the vendor sells and defends. Furthermore, Proposition 1
implies that the vendor sells if and only if

θ ≤ δ∞ =

v−c
.
Ω(1 − ḡ)

The comparative statics results follow from analyzing the effect of changes in θ, v, and 1 − ḡ
in the previous inequality.
[Proof of Lemma 1] For any t we define the number of periods before t that the vendor has
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seen z = j (for j = 1, 2, 3, 4) by
Ztj =

t−1
X

1{zs =j}

s=1



Given Zt = Ztj

4
j=1

, Bayesian updating implies that

p̂t ∼ Dir (α + Zt )

As Zt2 + Zt4 = Yt1 , the previous distribution implies that the vector


As

P4

j=1











p̂1t , p̂2t + p̂4t , p̂3t = p̂1t , θ̂t1 , p̂3t ∼ Dir α1 + Zt1 , α2 + α4 + Yt1 , α3 + x3t .

p̂jt = 1 and

P4

j=1

Ztj = t − 1, the marginal distribution of the probability of being

inspected at feria 1 at time t + 1 is




θ̂t1 ∼ Beta α2 + α4 + Yt1 , α1 + α3 + t − 1 − Yt1 .
The characterization of the distribution of θ̂t2 is completely analogous.
[Proof of Proposition 2] First, note that it is a direct extension of Proposition 1 to show
that in the long run the vendor sells in feria i if and only if θi ≤

v−c
.
Ω(1−ḡ)

To show that it is without loss of generality to focus only on targeted and unpredictable
policies, take any policy (θ1 , θ2 ) such that θ1 + θ2 = Θ.
- If the policy does not prevent selling in any feria, it is clear that both the targeted and
the unpredictable policies are weakly more efficient.
- If the policy prevents selling only in feria i, we have that θi >

v−c
Ω(1−ḡ)

≥ θ−i . As θi ≤ Θ,

we have that the targeted policy targeting feria 1 (or feria 2) is weakly more efficient.
- If the policy prevents selling in both ferias, we have that θ1 , θ2 >

v−c
.
Ω(1−ḡ)

As Θ/2 ≥

min{θ1 ; θ2 }, we have that the unpredictable policy (Θ/2, Θ/2) also prevents selling in both
ferias.
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Now we analyze the most efficient policy for different values of Θ:
1. If Θ <

v−c
:
Ω(1−ḡ)

In this case neither the targeted policy or the unpredictable policy prevent

selling in any feria.
2. If

v−c
Ω(1−ḡ)

v−c
≤ Θ < 2 Ω(1−ḡ)
. In this case then the targeted policy targeting feria 1(2) prevents

selling in feria 1(2) and does not prevent selling in feria 2(1). On the other hand, as
Θ/2

<

v−c
Ω(1−ḡ)

the unpredictable policy does not prevent selling in any feria.

v−c
then the unpredictable policy prevents selling in both ferias, while the
3. If Θ ≥ 2 Ω(1−ḡ)

targeted policy prevents selling in only one of them.
The vendor’s ability to circumvent the fine reaches a static value ḡ in the long-run. So she
only sells in a feria if her perceived probability of an enforcement visit is below the threshold
δ t . Hence, in the log-run, illegal selling is avoided in a feria if its inspection intensity θi is above
the threshold. Furthermore, as the total enforcement capacity Θ is fixed, the policy can either
reach the threshold in both ferias, in only one feria, or in neither feria. If enforcement capacity
is not high enough to reach δ t in both ferias, the inspector should choose a targeted policy to
prevent illegal sales in at least one feria
[Proof of Corollary 1] We analyze the different cases characterized in Proposition 1. For the
analysis we use that E[θ̂t ] Q δ t ⇐⇒ ΩE[θ̂t ] Q c/g(Yt ), and E[θ̂t ] Q δ t ⇐⇒ ΩE[θ̂t ](1−g(Yt ))+c Q
v.
• The agent does not sell in two cases
1. If v ≤ c/g(Yt ), the vendor does not sell if v < ΩE[θ̂t ]. This happens with probability
c
P v≤
g(Yt )

!

c
P v < ΩE[θ̂t ] v ≤
g(Yt )

!

=P



v < ΩE[θ̂t ]
(



c
v≤
g(Yt )

)!

c
= P v < min
; ΩE[θ̂t ]
g(Yt )
(
)!
c
= F min
; ΩE[θ̂t ]
.
g(Yt )
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!!

2. If v > c/g(Yt ) the vendor does not sell if E[θ̂t ] > δ t .39 The probability of this is
!

c
c
P v>
P v < ΩE[θ̂t ](1 − g(Yt )) + c v >
g(Yt )
g(Yt )
=P



!

=

v < ΩE[θ̂t ](1 − g(Yt )) + c

c
v>
g(Yt )



c
=P
< v < ΩE[θ̂t ](1 − g(Yt )) + c
g(Yt )
(



!!

!

!



= max F ΩE[θ̂t ](1 − g(Yt )) + c − F

c
;0
g(Yt )

)

.

The share of vendors that do not sell αN S is the sum of these two probabilities.
• The vendor sells openly in two cases
1. If v ≤ c/g(Yt ), the vendor does not sell if v > ΩE[θ̂t ]. This happens with probability
c
P v≤
g(Yt )

!

c
P v > ΩE[θ̂t ] v ≤
g(Yt )

!

!!

c
= P v > ΩE[θ̂t ]
v≤
g(Yt )
!
c
= P ΩE[θ̂t ] < v <
g(Yt )
(
!
)


c
= max F
− F ΩE[θ̂t ] ; 0 .
g(Yt )




2. If v > c/g(Yt ) the vendor sells openly if E[θ̂t ] ≤ δ t .40 The probability of this is
c
P v>
g(Yt )

!

c
P E[θ̂t ] ≤ δ t v >
g(Yt )

!

=P



E[θ̂t ] ≤ δ t



c
v>
g(Yt )

!!

!

c
< v 1{E[θ̂t ]≤δt }
=P
g(Yt )
!!
c
= 1−F
1{ΩE[θ̂t ]≤ g(Yc ) } .
g(Yt )
t
The share of vendors who sell openly αSO is the sum of these two probabilities.
• The vendor sells defensively only if δ t < E[θ̂t ] ≤ δ t .41 The share of vendors who sell
39

If v > c/g and E[θ̂t ] > δ t , the condition E[θ̂t ] > δ t is necessarily satisfied.
If v > c/g and E[θ̂t ] ≤ δ t the condition E[θ̂t ] ≤ δ t is necessarily satisfied.
41
Recall that the conditions δ t < δ t and v > c/g(Yt ) are equivalent.
40
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defensively αSD is


P

E[θ̂t ] > δ t



v ≥ ΩE[θ̂t ](1 − g(Yt )) + c



= P v ≥ ΩE[θ̂t ](1 − g(Yt )) + c 1{E[θ̂t ]>δt }








= 1 − F ΩE[θ̂t ](1 − g(Yt )) + c



1{ΩE[θ̂t ]> g(Yc ) }
t

To finish the proof we just need to note that ΩE[θ̂t ] ≤ c/g(Yt ) ⇐⇒ ΩE[θ̂t ](1 − g(Yt )) − c ≤ c/g(Yt )
and replace the corresponding values in each case.

E

Numerical Simulations

We numerically simulate the behavior of a representative vendor exposed to different levels and
schemes of enforcement. These simulations shed light on how the optimal choice evolves as
vendors acquire more information about the pattern of visits and inspection loopholes.

Vendors’ Behavior Over Time Vendors decide whether and how to sell hake in every
period t. The decision to sell in t is static but incorporates the information collected until t − 1.
Thus it may vary as more information is incorporated. In particular, vendors continuously
update their probability of receiving an enforcement visit as well as the effectiveness of defensive
strategies reducing the probability of a fine. Figure E.1 describes how the optimal decision in
different periods. It shows that the likelihood of selling is not stable. In this case, it decreases
quickly once the enforcement is introduced, and increases as the vendor learn about enforcement
weaknesses. After a few periods, it converges to the long-run equilibrium. One direct takeaway
of E.1 is that vendors’ behavior varies over time; the same policy evaluated in different moments
may yield different results.
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Figure E.1: Vendor’s Decision
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This figure shows the proportion of times in which a vendor sells hake in different periods. This graph depicts 1000
 simulations
using the following parameters θ = 0.4, v ∼ U (0.5, 1.5), c = 0.1, Ω = 18, θ1 = 0.05, g(Y ) = 0.7/ 1 + e−8×Y +28 , i.e.,ḡ = 0.7.
The probability of selling decreases quickly as the enforcement begins, however it increases as vendors learn about enforcement
weaknesses. After a number of periods, it converges to the “long-run” equilibrium based on model’s structural parameters.

Enforcement Intensity Vendors adapt their behavior according to the pattern of visits
they receive. We compare the behavior of vendors exposed to different frequencies of visits.
Figure 2 shows that vendors exposed to more intense enforcement tend to decrease the probability of selling quickly. However, they learn faster about enforcement weaknesses. Thus, after
a few periods, the latter effect may counterbalance the higher intensity effect, which makes
high-intensity enforcement less effective. As the number of periods increases, the selling decision converges to the long-run optimal. This result has relevant implications for enforcement
evaluation and design.
The figures E.2(a) and E.2(b) describe the timing and scope of adoption of defensive actions
depending on the frequency of the enforcement. Vendors exposed to more intense enforcement
learn quickly about loopholes, so they start adopting these actions earlier.
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Figure E.2: Probability of Selling Hake
(a) Low Frequency Enforcement
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

(b) High Frequency Enforcement
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0

sell openly
sell defensively
not sell

0

5

10

15
Period

20

25

30

sell openly
sell defensive
not sell

0

5

10

15
Period

20

25

30

Figure E.2(a) and E.2(b) describe vendors’ decision on whether and how to sell. This simulation uses the same
 parameters than
previous graph: θhigh = 0.5, θlow = 0.3, v ∼ U (0.5, 1.5), c = 0.1, Ω = 18, θ1 = 0.05, g(Y ) = 0.7/ 1 + e−2×Y +12 , i.e.,ḡ = 0.7. The
adoption of defensive strategies starts after a number of periods.

Enforcement Predictability We study the consequences of varying the predictability of
the enforcement visits. In particular, we study vendors’ behavior, assuming that every circuit
has two ferias and that the vendor alternates between them. If enforcement is predictable, one
of the ferias receives enforcement more intensely than the other. In our analysis, the probability
of receiving a visit in a non-targeted feria is zero. Conversely, under unpredictable enforcement,
both ferias have the same likelihood of receiving a visit.
The E.3(a) and E.3(b) show how, under predictable enforcement, the behavior of vendor
diverge across ferias, the probability of selling in a non-targeted feria tend to one, whereas in
a targeted feria tends to zero. i.e., the average tends to 0.5. The speed of convergence to 0.5
hinges on the overall enforcement frequency.
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Figure E.3: Probability of Selling Hake
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Figure E.3(a) and E.3(b) describe vendors’ decision vary depending on the feria they are selling. The model assumes vendors
alternate between taregeted and non-targeted feria. These simulations assume that in every period there’s half of the vendors in
each type of feria. The dashed line correspond to the average probability ofsale. This simulation uses assumes θhigh = 0.4, θlow =
0.25, v ∼ U (0.5, 1.5), c = 0.1, Ω = 18, θ1 = 0.05, g(Y ) = 0.7/ 1 + e−8×Y +28 , i.e.,ḡ = 0.7.

The figures E.4(a) and E.4(b) compare the average probability of selling hake under predictable and unpredictable enforcement using the same enforcement capacity. As discussed
in section 3.2.2, the long-run effects of one policy over the other depending on the structural
parameters of the model. However, in the short-run, the speed and scope of learning play a
role. Under most functional forms, the unpredictable enforcement seems to be more effective
in the short-run. Illegal sales in ferias fall sharply as soon as auditors start visiting, but under
predictable enforcement, the non-targeted feria does not benefit from this.
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Figure E.4: Probability of Selling Hake
(a) Low Frequency Enforcement
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Figure E.4(a) and E.4(b) describe vendors’ decision vary depending on the feria they are selling. The model
assumes vendors alternate between taregeted and non-targeted feria. These simulations assume that in every
period there’s half of the vendors in each type of feria. The dashed line correspond to the average probability of
sale. This simulation uses assumes θhigh = 0.4, θlow = 0.25, v ∼ U (0.5, 1.5), c = 0.1, Ω = 18, θ1 = 0.05, g(Y ) =

0.7/ 1 + e−8×Y +28 , i.e.,ḡ = 0.7.

Note about Agents Heterogeneity We introduce agents’ heterogeneity by agents that
differ in their valuation v. Specifically, suppose v is distributed according to the CDF F , whose
support is [v, v]. Assume c < v ≤ v < Ω. The applying 1 we get the following result
Corollary 1 In the case with heterogeneous agents let αN S , αSO , and αSD be the share of
agents not selling, selling openly, and selling defensively, respectively. This shares are given by

αN S =

αSO =







F ΩE[θ̂t ]

if ΩE[θ̂t ] ≤ c/g(Yt )






F ΩE[θ̂t ](1 − g(Yt )) + c

if ΩE[θ̂t ] > c/g(Yt );







1 − F ΩE[θ̂t ]

if ΩE[θ̂t ] ≤ c/g(Yt )




0

if ΩE[θ̂t ] > c/g(Yt ); and





0

αSD = 




1 − F ΩE[θ̂t ](1 − g(Yt )) + c
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if ΩE[θ̂t ] ≤ c/g(Yt )
if ΩE[θ̂t ] > c/g(Yt ).

Assumptions The numerical simulations presented above assume a functional form the the
learning curve g(Yt ) and a set (and strength) of priors. In particular, we assume: g(Yt ) =
ḡ
.
1+exp{−a×Y +b}

This functional form is handy because, limx→∞ g(x) = ḡ, and the parameters a

and b dictate the speed of convergence of the function. Other functional forms yield the same
qualitative results. The figures E.5(a) and E.5(b) describe how the ability and the beliefs evolve
over time for two different levels of enforcement. The idea is that vendors exposed to more
intense enforcement develop an ability to circumvent the fine faster, this effects counterbalances
the increase probability of a visit.
Figure E.5: Beliefs Updating and Learnning Curve
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Figure E.5(a) and E.5(b) how vendors learn about loopholes and update the probability of a visit. These figures use the same
inputs than other simulations, i.e., ḡ = 0.7, a = 8, b = 28, θ1 = 0.05 (α0 + α1 = 40)

F

Further Details on the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis

The section 7 describes the cost-effectiveness analysis of each treatment. These calculations
are based on the following parameters:
- Costs: The total cost of implementing enforcement was $ 62,900.25, which is divided
into fixed costs $ 7,338.06, and variable costs: $ 55,562.19. The fixed costs include
administrative staff salaries, central office coordination, etc. The variable costs include
the specific costs incurred to implement the enforcement (i.e., financial compensation
of inspectors, gasoline, etc.). Based on Sernapesca information, deploying enforcement
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in an unpredictable way is 10% more costly regarding staff availability. The cost of
implementing enforcement at low frequency is obtained by calculating the (variable) cost
of each visit and multiplying by the number of visits under this new regime, adding the
fixed costs.
The total cost of implementing the information campaign was $ 16,213.53, which includes
the printing and distribution of flyers, posters, and letters in treated neighborhoods.
- Reduction of fish sales: The estimated effects of selling hake during the ban presented in
section 5 are translated into numbers of fishes “saved.” This exercise takes into account
that every stall has 25 hake fishes available, there are 2.57 fish stalls in each feria. Each
circuit operates 5 days a week, and the effects consider the three last weeks of September.
The enforcement treatment contemplated 83 circuits, whereas 26 circuits are located in
municipalities assigned to receive information campaign with a high level of saturation.
The information gathered from the vendors surveyed provided useful information to define the right parameters regarding the likely reduction on fish sales as a result of our
interventions.

G

Departures from the Pre-Analysis Plan

We registered this trial on September 15, 2015 (before the data collection was completed) in
the AEA registry. Our approach to analysis and the outcome variables we focus on in this
paper closely mirror the project narrative we uploaded before we had access to any data. We
highlight the most notable departures from the pre-analysis plan (PAP) here:
1. The experimental design section of the PAP mentions that the enforcement group would
be divided into two sub-groups: One in which vendors would receive only a warning letter
about illegal behavior, and one in which we would follow that up with inspections and
fines. In practice, Sernapesca officials did not implement the treatments any differently
across these two sub-groups. So we do not report this sub-sample analysis. Our data
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show that vendor behavior was not statistically distinguishable across these sub-groups.
2. The PAP mentions our sample size as 153 circuits, based on information we had collected
on the existence of fish markets by calling municipalities before launching the project.
During data collection we learnt that 40 of those circuits did not have any fish-stalls.
Mystery shoppers could not visit another 7 circuits for logistical reasons. Our final analysis sample therefore contains only 106 circuits. These two sources of attrition are not
correlated with any observable characteristics, nor with the treatment assignment.
3. We had not anticipated that vendors would try to cheat by claiming that the fish was
caught in August. This is something we learnt from our mystery shoppers soon after we
started data collection. In the PAP, we mention only that we will track vendor reactions
to enforcement activity, but do not mention ‘freezing’ specifically.
4. The PAP does not delve into the level of detail that this paper does. For example, we
did not know exactly which fish were close substitutes for hake. We learnt from our data
that pomfret was the other fish most commonly sold by hake vendors, and we therefore
analyze effects on the price of pomfret. This price analysis could therefore be viewed as
“exploratory” even though we had pre-specified our interest in studying price effects.
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